Pathways and the Cautious Testing of Options
Dr. Zaid Abdulwahab al-Adhami
Researcher in International Relations
Introduction
The conclusion of the mission of the US-led Global Coalition in Iraq, known as Operation Inherent Resolve, on 30 September 2026 marks an important milestone in the course of Iraqi-American relations. The significance of this development is not confined to the political and security dimensions of the relationship, which are tied to the end of twelve years of combat operations and logistical and intelligence support. Rather, it extends to the questions it raises about the future of the strategic partnership between the two countries and the domestic and external factors that will shape it.
The departure of Global Coalition forces from Iraq coincided with broader trends in American strategy that began to take shape years ago. These trends rest on reducing direct military engagement in regional and international conflict zones and transferring the task of managing security threats to local and regional partners. Within this vision, ending Operation Inherent Resolve is consistent with the political discourse that President Donald Trump has adopted since his first election campaign, when he criticized the cost and strategic value of foreign wars and called for redirecting American resources and capabilities toward domestic priorities and competition with the great powers. Admittedly, the second Trump administration has not hesitated to use military force to achieve specific objectives, as shown by Operations Midnight Hammer, Epic Fury, and Wall of Steel against Iran. However, this does not negate its adoption of a strategic approach based on limiting long-term military deployment and reducing direct security commitments in conflict zones.
Reducing the American military presence in Iraq, which operated under the umbrella of the Global Coalition command, helped limit the exposure of American forces and facilities to attacks by pro-Iranian armed factions. These factions had used the American military presence as a bargaining chip within the broader competition and conflict between Washington and Tehran. Moreover, this course is consistent with repeated Iraqi demands to reorganize the foreign military presence and end the Coalition’s combat missions. Accordingly, Washington gained an opportunity to reshape its presence in Iraq in a form that provokes less political and security controversy.
The departure of Global Coalition forces opens the door wide to redefining Iraqi-American relations on new foundations. These foundations should be more balanced and closer to the pattern of traditional bilateral partnerships between sovereign states. From this perspective, the coming phase will be a serious test of the ability of Baghdad and Washington to move from a security relationship shaped by the necessities of war and counterterrorism to a bilateral relationship governed by mutual interests and cooperation in security, the economy, culture, and technology.
The successful transition of Iraqi-American relations from a security partnership with a clear military dimension to one that focuses more heavily on political, economic, and technological aspects remains largely dependent on the ability of both sides to manage the repercussions of US-Iranian competition inside Iraq and to keep the country insulated from that conflict. Iraqi armed factions loyal to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continue to exist, and they retain the capacity to target American interests in Iraq and neighboring countries whenever regional tensions escalate. Consequently, their continued presence constitutes one of the most prominent determinants of this transformation and one of its greatest challenges.
Determinants of Iraqi-American Relations
The end of the Global Coalition’s mission in Iraq moves security and strategic relations between Baghdad and Washington into a new phase of interaction, one characterized by a redefinition of interests, instruments, and roles. Iraqi-American relations moved beyond the framework of military cooperation tied to counterterrorism years ago, and they now encompass a wider range of security, economic, political, and diplomatic files. Therefore, the most pressing question concerns the shape of the relationship once the Coalition’s military presence has ended. Against this backdrop, a number of determinants emerge that will help shape Iraqi-American relations in the coming phase.
First. Armed Groups
The success of the post-Coalition phase is tied to how far the Iraqi state succeeds in imposing its legitimate monopoly on the use of force. The foremost challenge facing the government lies in dealing with armed factions that still retain military capabilities independent of state institutions and that reject, for ideological and self-interested reasons, the principle of full submission to official command and control. This issue is one of the decisive factors in determining the nature of the future relationship between Baghdad and Washington. Indeed, the Iraqi government’s ability to bring the armed factions under control will directly affect the level of regional and American confidence in Iraq’s stability as a security and economic partner.
Armed groups that can influence decisions of war and peace outside the official frameworks of the state continue to exist, and they openly claim or encourage strikes on the vital interests of neighboring countries. Their continued presence will implicate Iraq directly in the war and weaken its ability to pursue a balanced foreign policy. Therefore, the government’s success in strengthening state authority over the security sphere is an essential condition for consolidating stability, attracting investment, and maintaining balanced relations with the various regional and international parties.
The process of confining weapons to the state in Iraq cannot be understood in isolation from the influence of regional and international actors, foremost among them the United States and Iran. Although the direct American military presence has ended, Washington still possesses multiple instruments for influencing Iraq’s political and security environment. These include security partnerships, intelligence cooperation, and arming and training programs, as well as economic, financial, and diplomatic leverage. Moreover, the inclusion of some Iraqi armed factions on American terrorism lists keeps the possibility of American escalation or intervention alive whenever Washington judges that its interests or the security of its partners are at risk. Iran, in turn, continues to exercise tangible security and economic influence through its relations with a number of Iraqi factions and political forces. As a result, the question of confining weapons to the state has become an arena in which regional competition intersects with the challenges of building the Iraqi state and its security institutions.
The most likely scenario in the coming phase appears to be the gradual absorption of the armed factions and their institutional reorganization, rather than a swift and decisive resolution or direct confrontation. The Iraqi government recognizes that any attempt to impose radical and immediate solutions may carry political and security risks that would be difficult to contain, particularly given the growing administrative and institutional entrenchment of armed groups within state institutions. Accordingly, decision-makers in Baghdad are drawn toward an approach based on narrowing the margins of military independence enjoyed by some factions and regulating their roles and their relations with official security and economic institutions.
Integrating armed groups into government institutions under the banner of “confining weapons to the state” carries several risks related to the structure of Iraq’s political system. The boundaries between official institutions and informal actors become blurred amid a crisis of organizational and political loyalties inside state institutions. This blurring weakens the neutrality of the state and its ability to take security, political, and economic decisions free from partisan or factional influence. Consequently, the integration process would turn from a tool for strengthening state authority into a mechanism for legitimizing the influence of armed actors within its institutions.
Second. Iranian Influence
Iran does not view Iraq merely as a neighboring state or an area of regional influence. Rather, it sees Iraq as a fundamental pillar of its national security architecture and its strategic depth. Since 2003, Tehran has sought to build an extensive network of political, economic, and security structures inside Iraq in order to prevent the emergence of a political and security order that threatens its strategic interests. From this standpoint, the Iranian objective is not limited to preserving political influence within Iraqi state institutions. It also extends to ensuring the survival of a political and security environment that allows Tehran to influence Iraqi decisions on security, the economy, and foreign policy.
Iranian influence in Iraq rests on a complex web of political and economic relationships that enable Tehran to shape Iraqi decision-making. Accordingly, Washington seeks to influence the Iraqi political environment in a way that corrects the course of the state and limits the ability of forces close to Iran to strengthen their positions within the centers where political, security, and economic decisions are shaped and taken. At the same time, Washington aims to preserve an Iraqi-American partnership that is consistent with US objectives at the regional and international levels.
President Donald Trump’s return to the White House for a second term marked a shift toward a more explicit approach to Iraq as one of the main arenas of US-Iranian competition. After the end of the Global Coalition’s mission, Washington no longer regarded a direct military presence as the primary instrument for protecting its interests. Instead, it turned to political, economic, and diplomatic pressure in order to affect the spaces of Iranian influence within the Iraqi state. Hence, clearer American positions emerged on Iranian influence, the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the role of armed factions in the political system, and the arrangements for forming the Iraqi government. A notable example of Washington’s use of political pressure toward Baghdad is the social media post in which President Trump opposed the designation of Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, to form the Iraqi government.
This approach rests on a strategic assumption. It holds that curbing Iranian influence requires reshaping Iraq’s political and institutional environment in a way that reduces Tehran’s ability to affect decision-making and pushes Baghdad toward policies more independent of Iranian considerations. However, this is a complex process, and the mechanisms for carrying it out are not available in Iraq because of the structural dysfunction that afflicts the political process across all its institutions.
Baghdad’s ability to build strong and independent state institutions will remain the subject of continuous competition between two opposing visions. The American vision pushes for a centralized state that holds a firmer monopoly on force and stands at a greater distance from Tehran in security and economic matters. The Iranian vision, by contrast, prefers to maintain political, security, and economic arrangements that guarantee the continuation of its influence in Iraq. Furthermore, these arrangements limit the likelihood of Iraq’s full engagement in regional and international alliances hostile to Tehran, particularly under scenarios in which war resumes.
Third. The War on Iran
The US-Israeli war on Iran is one of the most prominent determinants that may affect the nature of Iraqi-American relations in the period following the Global Coalition’s withdrawal. Although the direct American military presence in Iraq has ended, the country remains at the heart of the geopolitical environment tied to the Iranian-American and Iranian-Israeli conflicts. This is due to its geographic location and to the entanglement of regional interests and influence on its territory.
Iraq faces complex security challenges imposed by its geopolitical position in a turbulent regional environment. These challenges take the form of the use of its territory, its airspace, and the pro-Iranian Iraqi armed groups within the equations of deterrence and reciprocal retaliation between Tehran and its regional and international adversaries. This became evident in recent years, when American interests and bases in Iraq and some neighboring countries came under rocket and drone attacks that armed factions publicly claimed.
If regional turmoil persists or military confrontation between Iran and the United States is renewed, Baghdad will find itself under mounting American pressure to adopt stricter security measures. Such measures would aim to enforce the state’s monopoly on the use of force and to prevent Iraqi territory from becoming an arena for settling regional conflicts or a platform for targeting the interests of the United States and its allies. In this context, Washington will continue to regard the Iraqi government’s ability to contain these threats as a key indicator of the effectiveness of the security partnership between the two countries. Furthermore, it will treat that ability as one of the fundamental determinants of the future of Iraqi-American relations after the withdrawal of Global Coalition forces.
The resumption of military confrontation with Iran redefines the priorities of security cooperation between Baghdad and Washington. As the threat posed by the terrorist organization ISIS has receded compared with previous years, the focus of American-Iraqi security attention has shifted from counterterrorism to managing the regional repercussions of the war and preventing its spread into Iraq. In such circumstances, intelligence cooperation, information sharing, and the monitoring of Iraq’s borders and airspace grow in importance, since they help contain the risks arising from the regional conflict and prevent Iraq from sliding into direct confrontation. Hence, the nature of the threats associated with the war on Iran may help reshape the agenda of security cooperation between the two countries and set its priorities in the post-Coalition phase. Accordingly, Iraq’s success in maintaining a foreign policy that secures its strategic interests amid wartime conditions and a turbulent regional environment will be one of the factors shaping the stability of its relations with the United States in the coming years.
Fourth. Economic Relations
The economic dimension is one of the most prominent determinants of the future of Iraqi-American relations after the withdrawal of Global Coalition forces. As security and military files have become less central than in previous years, both Baghdad and Washington have shown an inclination to redirect bilateral relations away from the military sphere and toward economic and investment cooperation, as well as infrastructure connected to the energy sector.
This approach by the American and Iraqi governments stems from a shared recognition that sustaining relations between the two countries requires establishing long-term economic interests that transcend political and security fluctuations. Therefore, attracting American investment, developing the energy sector, rehabilitating infrastructure, transferring technology, and diversifying the Iraqi economy have become some of the files capable of providing a more stable foundation for the relationship. Moreover, Washington views a stronger American economic presence in Iraq as a tool for supporting internal stability and reducing Iraq’s dependence on regional and international partners that compete with the United States. Baghdad, for its part, sees it as an opportunity to benefit from American financial and technological capabilities in support of its development and reconstruction plans.
The first foreign visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi, which took him to the United States at the invitation of President Donald Trump, acquired particular importance. The messages exchanged between the two governments reflected a shared desire to move relations from their traditional framework, tied to the military presence and counterterrorism, to a broader framework built on economic and developmental partnership. Furthermore, the meeting between al-Zaidi and Trump points to the possibility of a structural shift in US-Iraqi relations. This shift would involve moving from a model dominated by security considerations over the past two decades to one that rests more heavily on economic and investment partnership.
The success of this transformation requires strengthening state authority and reducing the influence of armed groups over commercial activity and economic decision-making. If this cannot be achieved, foreign investments, including American ones, may become part of the competition among local forces instead of serving as a tool for supporting development and stability. Moreover, persistent security challenges and the absence of institutional reforms capable of confining weapons to the state would limit the value of economic reforms and weaken investor confidence.
The economic determinant in Iraqi-American relations is not limited to investment opportunities and cooperation in energy. It also includes the instruments of financial leverage that Washington possesses to influence Iraqi policy. The link between Iraqi oil revenues and the American financial system gives the United States the ability to influence the political behavior of the Iraqi state, whether through coercion and economic sanctions or through support and financing. Accordingly, the economy is also one of the most important instruments of American influence in the period following the withdrawal of Global Coalition forces from Iraq.
Possible Pathways for Iraqi-American Relations
The future of Iraqi-American relations depends on a set of domestic, regional, and international variables, foremost among them the expected course of the US-Iranian confrontation and its repercussions for Iraq’s security environment. Several scenarios are possible for the relationship between Baghdad and Washington after the Global Coalition’s withdrawal from Iraq, and they are outlined below.
Scenario One. Strategic Partnership
This scenario assumes that Iraqi-American relations succeed in moving from the framework of traditional security cooperation to a more comprehensive and sustainable strategic partnership. The realization of this path depends on a number of factors. Foremost among them is a decline in the intensity of the US-Iranian confrontation, which would ease the pressures Iraq faces as a result of the two sides’ competition on its territory. In addition, it depends on the Iraqi government’s success in imposing the state’s monopoly on weapons and strengthening its sovereignty over security and military decisions.
If these two conditions are met, bilateral relations are likely to undergo a qualitative shift toward wider areas of cooperation, including investment, energy, technology, education, military training, and the development of security institutions. Furthermore, this path may enhance Iraq’s standing as a reliable regional partner of the United States. It may also give Baghdad wider room to diversify its international partnerships and attract foreign investment, thereby supporting development efforts and economic stability.
Iraq’s integration into regional projects aimed at strengthening economic connectivity and transport and energy corridors, such as the trilateral cooperation projects with Turkey and Syria, would improve the prospects for an Iraqi-American partnership. The United States looks favorably on initiatives that help link Iraq to regional trade and energy networks and provide diverse alternatives for transport and export routes and energy supplies, thereby reducing Iraq’s reliance on a limited number of routes or on any single country. Therefore, Baghdad’s success in becoming a regional hub for transport, energy, and trade would make it a partner of real weight within the American vision for promoting economic stability and regional integration in the Middle East.
Scenario Two. Cautious Partnership
This scenario can be built on the idea that the relationship will not move toward a full strategic partnership, yet it will not slide into rupture or confrontation either. Instead, it will remain governed by the logic of managing balances as long as the US-Iranian conflict continues to fluctuate without a decisive outcome. Under this uncertainty, Iraqi-American relations are likely to move toward a form of cautious partnership, one based on continued cooperation in security, intelligence, and economic fields while avoiding a transition to a wide-ranging strategic alliance.
This scenario assumes that Baghdad will continue to pursue a policy of balance between Washington and Tehran in order to protect its interests and avoid being drawn into the politics of regional axes. The United States, in turn, will continue to support the Iraqi government in counterterrorism, energy, and investment. However, it will maintain its pressure with regard to curbing the influence of armed groups and limiting economic and military relations between Baghdad and Tehran.
This pattern of relations will remain subject to a number of structural constraints. Foremost among them are the persistence of Iranian influence inside Iraq and the divergence between the positions of Baghdad and Washington on certain regional issues, in addition to the sensitivity surrounding the American presence and role in the political discourse of some Iraqi forces. Therefore, cooperation between the two sides will continue within the framework of managing shared interests and containing disagreements, without reaching the level of a full strategic alliance or sliding into rupture and confrontation.
Scenario Three. Tension and Divergence
This scenario assumes that the uncertainty governing Iraqi-American relations will persist because of their direct connection to regional developments. It further assumes the absence of both a stable regional settlement and a decisive escalation that would redraw regional balances and their domestic repercussions for Iraq.
The repercussions of the US-Iranian conflict and its possible trajectories may deepen the disagreements between Baghdad and Washington over a number of core issues. Foremost among them are the future of armed groups, the nature of the relationship with Iran, and the form that security cooperation will take after the end of the Global Coalition’s mission. If these differences persist without stable understandings being reached, bilateral relations may move toward political tension and gradual strategic divergence.
Under this scenario, the United States will rely more heavily on economic and financial pressure to influence Iraqi behavior, especially on matters related to Iranian influence, armed groups, and economic relations with Tehran. Accordingly, instruments such as investment, energy, financial sanctions, waivers for energy imports, and access to the global financial system will become some of the most important means of American influence over Iraq.
The Iraqi government will face growing difficulty in responding to American demands for restructuring the security environment and curbing the influence of armed groups. At the same time, Iraq will continue to need cooperation with the United States in certain security and economic fields. This contradiction would limit the prospects for developing the relationship into a comprehensive strategic partnership. Moreover, it would keep the relationship governed by crisis management more than by the development and consolidation of shared interests.
Conclusion
The end of the Global Coalition’s mission in Iraq does not mean the end of Iraqi-American relations. Rather, it represents their transition from a phase anchored in a direct military presence to a new phase in which long-term political, economic, and security considerations take precedence. Although the future of these relations will remain affected by the course of the US-Iranian conflict, the most decisive factor will be the Iraqi state’s ability to consolidate its sovereignty, strengthen the independence of its national decision-making, and manage its external balances competently.
The coming phase is likely to witness a shift in the instruments of influence and competition inside Iraq. The military factor will decline in relative importance in favor of economic and financial leverage, energy, investment, and regional partnerships. Therefore, the future of Iraqi-American relations will not be measured solely by the size of the American military presence or the level of security cooperation. Instead, it will be measured by the extent to which the two sides can build a new framework of shared interests that moves beyond the legacy of the post-2003 era and responds to rapid regional and international transformations.
The US military intervention in Iraq in 2003 was a fundamental turning point in the structure of the Iraqi political system, as it brought down the existing state institutions and reshaped the political system according to new arrangements. The experience that followed revealed crises, structural challenges, institutional fragility, and difficulties in managing political and social pluralism. In light of this, one conclusion becomes necessary. As the principal external actor that led the toppling of the state and the rebuilding of the political system, the United States bears a measure of historical responsibility for supporting Iraq’s stability and strengthening its state institutions, in a way that helps address the fundamental imbalances that emerged in the post-2003 period.
