Prof. Wisal Najib Al-Azzawi
Professor of Political Systems and Public Policy · Former Dean of the Political Science Department at Nahrain University
What Is Public Policy?
Public policy emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s as one of the major concepts of political science and quickly swept across the discipline. Even so, thinkers and researchers have yet to agree on a precise definition of it. This is largely because they come from different settings, intellectual traditions and academic foundations. The main perspectives and theories can be summarised briefly as follows.
Some scholars approach public policy through systems analysis. David Easton, for one, defines it as the authoritative allocation of values (that is, material and non-material needs) across society, through binding decisions and activities that distribute those values as part of a continuous interaction between inputs, outputs and feedback. Working within the same systems framework, Gabriel Almond sees public policy as the outcome of an organised process in which inputs (demands and support) interact with outputs (capabilities, decisions and policies). For Almond, it reflects how well the political system performs in its extractive, regulative, distributive, symbolic, responsive and international capabilities, as expressed in the decisions it actually takes.
Others start from the perspective of power and elites. The leading figure here is Harold Lasswell, whom many regard as one of the founders of the policy sciences. Lasswell developed a comprehensive model that reframed the analysis and formulation of public policy in systematic, scientific terms, with the aim of understanding how policies are made, who influences them and what effects they have. He argued that the study of public policy should be multidisciplinary, focused on solving problems and grounded in clear normative principles. His interest went beyond government decision-making to include the social, economic and legal factors that shape policy, a view he set out in his well-known book Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. There he treats politics as a process concerned with the distribution of resources, values and influence. Seen through this question of who gets what, when and how, public policy is the product of choosing and ranking priorities, a process in which institutions, actors and their interests are closely intertwined before a policy moves on to implementation and evaluation.
A third school, prompted by the criticisms levelled at both the power-based and the systems-based approaches, took a different route and built its view around government itself. Thomas Dye argued that public policy is, in essence, whatever a government chooses to do or not to do. It shows what a government really thinks and serves as a means of managing conflict within society. It also regulates behaviour, organises bureaucracies, distributes benefits and collects taxes, among other things. James Anderson defined public policy as a purposeful course of action followed by an individual or a group in dealing with a problem or a matter of concern. Carl Friedrich took a similar view, describing it as a proposed course of action by a person, group or government within a given environment, one that identifies the opportunities to be pursued and the obstacles to be overcome in order to reach a goal or achieve a particular purpose.
In line with these Western perspectives, most Arab researchers define public policy from the government’s point of view, treating it as one of the core functions of government and a responsibility that properly belongs to it. Dr Khairi Abdul-Qawi, for example, defines it as the political and non-political processes and procedures that a government undertakes in order to agree on how a problem should be defined, identify the alternative solutions and the basis for choosing between them, and so prepare the ground for selecting the option to be adopted as binding public policy. This comes very close to the definition in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, which describes public policy as the policies of government: a set of basic goals or programmes, together with decisions on how those goals are to be set or carried out. In this sense, public policy is defined by both its ends and its means. We share Dr Ahmad Saifan’s view that public policy expresses a government’s will to act or to refrain from acting. It is a structured and coherent body of decisions and actions that can be attributed to a public authority, whether local, national or supranational. As such, it has four elements: a goal, a choice of actions to achieve it, a public declaration of the policy by those responsible for it, and its implementation. In our book Public Policy: A Study in a New Field of Knowledge, we identify four processes. The first two, defining the problem and then formulating and planning the policy, together make up policy design and making. The third is implementation, which turns decisions into reality and into government programmes of action. The fourth is evaluation, which follows up on the results once the policy has been applied.
Before leaving the theoretical framework, it is important to distinguish between three terms that are often confused: the ministerial platform, the government programme and public policy. The ministerial platform is the broad political vision that the prime minister presents to parliament, setting out the principles and main goals that will guide the government. The government programme is the detailed plan for delivering that platform, covering the projects, services and mechanisms through which those goals are to be achieved on the ground. Put simply, the platform is the headline promise and the programme is the plan for delivering it. Public policy is something else again. It is the set of decisions, principles and overall framework that the state chooses to follow, or not to follow, in dealing with social and economic issues. It is comprehensive in scope and carries on from one government to the next. Its purpose is to steer the country’s development and shape its future in line with the nation’s guiding ideals, the values of its society and its constitution. In other words, public policy is the state’s overall strategy and its highest level of direction, whereas the ministerial platform is a temporary, practical plan of action that a government puts forward to carry out its mandate during its time in office.
Iraq as a Case Study
The starting point is one key idea: the quality of public policy depends not only on how decisions are drafted, but also on whether state institutions are able to set priorities, make decisions, coordinate with one another, turn decisions into workable policies, and then assess the results and correct course.
In Iraq, political, institutional, economic and social factors are all bound up in the making of public policy. Reform therefore cannot stop at amending laws or restructuring institutions. It requires the state’s decision-making systems, and the way the state itself is run, to be developed and modernised. The central problem is how far Iraq’s state institutions are able to design, make and deliver public policies that are coherent, integrated in their planning and budgeting, and realistic to implement. They must do so in the face of multiple centres of power and influence, overlapping mandates, weak coordination, understanding and cohesion between institutions, and the many obstacles that stand in the way of implementing decisions and evaluating their results.
This raises the following research questions:
- How is public policy designed and made in Iraq?
- What factors influence and drive the decision-making process, and where does the gap between making decisions and implementing them lie?
- Are Iraqi institutions effective and efficient?
- What are the institutional prerequisites for reforming public policy in Iraq?
Designing and making public policy is a methodical process for finding the most effective solutions available to the problems and issues that societies and states face. It is also an ongoing effort to weigh up options, adopt decisions and give expression to existing experience and practice. Policy-making is therefore closely tied to how government activity develops, to the extent to which the state takes decisions, and to how far it is possible, and desirable, for individuals to influence policies and political events. The process has five stages: identifying the problem, setting the political agenda, formulating the policy, implementing it and evaluating it.
First, Iraq’s 2005 Constitution sets out the state’s governmental institutions, both federal and non-federal, as well as its non-governmental ones, and defines the roles they are meant to play in making the political system effective. However, the ruling parties and political forces have run state institutions and agencies on the principle of consensus politics, dividing power along the lines of political sectarianism. This has produced one political crisis after another, damaging the performance of government institutions and leaving public policy too weak to achieve its goals or solve problems. On top of this come two major obstacles: corruption and terrorism. As a result, it has become impossible to speak of an effective Iraqi political system under the policies of the current elite.
Second, under the 2005 Constitution, Iraq’s political institutions fall into three groups. The formal institutions are the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The non-federal institutions are the regions, the governorates not organised into a region, and local administrations. Then there are the non-governmental institutions: political parties and forces, social movements and the religious establishment. Yet despite this proliferation of institutions, they have, to some extent, failed to embed institutional values or to overcome the problems that hold back development, the building of a national identity, societal security and lasting peace.
Looking at Iraq’s political system as a whole, institutionalism and its values have been weak in both the thinking and the practice of successive political elites, from the founding of the Iraqi state to the present day. As a result, the system has suffered from the personalisation of power, with authority revolving around the ruling elites and state institutions reduced to mere tools for justifying the practices of those in power. This, in turn, has produced values in both state and society that run counter to institution-building. These values act as obstacles and brakes on any development policy, whether partial or comprehensive, and hinder government policy in every field. The weakness of institutional work in Iraq has had a direct effect on the performance of the political system and on its ability to take the decisions needed to manage the affairs of state and society.
Third, consider the nature of political performance in Iraq. Institutional values and the performance of a political system are clearly linked: the stronger the one, the stronger the other. Political performance is the practical arena in which all state institutions apply public policy, from the private sphere to the public one. It is through this performance that the values held by the ruling elites are translated into action, and it is on this basis that the extent of their political legitimacy is determined.
The reality is that Iraq’s state institutions have not been able to meet the needs of society or uphold the law effectively, and this has cost them the trust of Iraqi society. It also means that, throughout its history, Iraq’s political system has been in direct confrontation with the crises of legitimacy, distribution, penetration, participation, integration and identity. Together with domestic and international conflicts and wars, these crises created an unstable environment that drained the country’s economic resources, dragged down its sectoral and human development indicators and blocked most of the channels through which government policy could be implemented. Add to this the absence of justice, equality, good governance and the rule of law, the result of a weak state at the mercy of sectarian divisions that led Iraq into a dark tunnel, particularly during the sectarian war. All of this hit the economy hard and stalled development plans. In our view, the period after the sectarian war has proved dangerous in its own right, marked by the alarming spread of corruption in all its forms across most parts of Iraq’s institutions. According to Transparency International’s 2020 report, the level of public-sector corruption in Iraq stood at 79 per cent, placing the country 160th out of 180 on the Corruption Perceptions Index. The 2022 Global Sustainable Competitiveness Index, which covers 180 countries, tells a similar story. It ranked Iraq 162nd for natural capital, 125th for intellectual capital, 141st for social capital, 140th for economic sustainability, 142nd for governance performance and 163rd for governance efficiency. In other words, Iraq ranks among the lowest-placed countries on every one of these measures (as reported in the study ‘Institutional Values and the Performance of the Iraqi Political System’, published in Qadaya Siyasiya [Political Issues], no. 78).
Fourth, and building on the above, the combined effect of weak institutional values, declining political performance and the crises of the Iraqi political system comes to a head in the problem of decision-making. There are too many centres of decision and influence, and coordination between institutions is weak. The data needed for decision-making is either missing or inadequate, policies and decisions are rarely assessed in advance, and there is a gap between political decisions and technical expertise. All of these factors have affected public policy and held back its progress.
Whatever the type of regime in power, there is always a mechanism through which decisions, public policies and positions are made. Decision-making follows a particular path and passes through several stages. It is shaped by factors in both the internal and external environment, with all the challenges and pressures they bring, as well as by goals, criteria and available capabilities. It is then followed by the decision’s repercussions and expected outcomes. The process therefore has a number of key junctures, where institutional arrangements interact with the personal and psychological make-up of decision-makers and with the degree of influence held by members of the decision-making circle (that is, the power and sway of individuals). In the end, the decision emerges and is handled according to the structure of the political system, whether presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential, and the mechanism reflects both the type of regime and its governing ideology.
In Iraq’s case, the decision-making mechanism looks more like improvisation and populism. It is subject to individual and factional interests and is swayed by media and psychological pressure. This raises a number of pressing questions. What method does an Iraqi decision-maker follow when faced with a problem, and how do they favour one solution over another when choosing between the options on the table? Has this method changed at all? Whom do they consult and turn to, and why those people rather than others? Are they the same people on every issue? Are they chosen for their competence or for their loyalty? Do decision-makers draw on structured advisory circles and on the relevant state institutions? How do they obtain the facts and information that support their decisions, and how is that information read, analysed and used? What criteria shape their decisions: values, culture or self-interest? And finally, what powers does the decision-maker hold, both in law and in practice? These questions, and the many that follow from them, call for careful surveying, tracking, investigation and analysis. The aim is to improve the quality of political decision-making in Iraq in support of modernisation and development, and to rid it of impulsiveness and arbitrariness. This also means taking account of the institutional frameworks that support decision-making. The institutional framework should serve as one of the most important checks on decision-making and a central link in the process, beginning, in principle, with the legislative and oversight authority of the Council of Representatives.
From all of this we can conclude that political decision-making in Iraq is still marked by a great deal of confusion and ambiguity, and that its many sources are unstable and often contradict one another. Examples of these clashing positions are easy to find. They include the conflicting stances of the Presidency Council and the prime minister on federalism, as well as divisions over the oil and gas law, the power to ratify rulings of the Iraqi High Tribunal, the Accountability and Justice Law, foreign private security companies, the constitutionality of the Federal Supreme Court, the Awakening (Sahwa) Councils, the Popular Mobilisation Forces Law, the law on regional guard forces, the arming of tribes, the integration of armed factions into the defence and security services, the amnesty law, the personal status law, relations with Iraq’s Arab and non-Arab neighbours, relations with the United States, and the Law on Governorates Not Organised into a Region, to name only some of the conflicting decisions and laws. All of this stems from Iraq’s lack of unified national and strategic policies, and of public policies that could help make the political system more stable and effective. Such policies would also build a more harmonious relationship between society and the political system at home, through the services that government programmes, as the practical expression of public policy, deliver to the public. Society would respond in kind, helping to sustain and defend the political system through political participation and the wider political process, while also reinforcing the democratic character of the Iraqi political system in the eyes of the outside world.
Pathways to Reform
Reform can be pursued along five main pathways:
- Reforming the decision-making system. This means strengthening decision-making based on data and evidence, and developing public policy units within state institutions.
- Institutional reform. This involves clarifying each institution’s remit, reducing overlap between institutions, strengthening coordination across government and, finally, linking responsibility to authority and to results.
- Administrative reform. This is where the real solution lies, and what is needed is nothing short of a revolution in the administrative apparatus and its structures. That means selecting people on merit, developing professional skills and administrative experience, tackling overstaffing and disguised unemployment, and laying the foundations of integrity while fighting administrative corruption.
- Strengthening accountability and regular evaluation. This means setting measurable performance indicators, evaluating policies after they have been implemented and, most importantly, linking public spending to results.
- Moving from crisis management to policy-making. In Iraq we are still at the stage of managing crises and have not yet moved into making policy. This is, in fact, the central idea behind everything above, because genuine reform means shifting from responding to problems after they occur to anticipating them through planning, risk analysis and long-term policy-making.
Reforming public policy in Iraq does not necessarily call for new institutions. What it calls for is making existing institutions more efficient, improving the mechanisms of decision-making, strengthening coordination between institutions, and linking policies to data, resources and performance indicators. Institutional reform then becomes an integrated process that begins with the quality of a decision and ends with measuring its impact on citizens and the state.
The problem of public policy in Iraq is not just a matter of how decisions are made. It is about whether institutions can turn a decision into a coherent policy, and that policy into measurable results. The relationship between decision and institution can be seen from three angles. First, the decision sets the direction: public policy begins by identifying the problem and the priority, and then deciding how to deal with it. Second, the institution turns the decision into action. This is where clear mandates, resources, administrative competence and coordination between institutions all come into play. A decision does not automatically become a successful policy; it needs an institution capable of translating it into programmes and procedures. Third, the results allow both the decision and the institution to be reassessed. If a policy fails to achieve its goals, the question should not only be ‘Was the decision right?’ but also ‘Was the institution capable of carrying it out?’ and ‘Were the mechanisms for implementation, follow-up and evaluation effective?’
Decision → Institution → Implementation → Results → Evaluation → Correcting the decision
A good decision is of little value if there is no institution capable of putting it into practice. Equally, an institution cannot be effective if the decisions it receives are unclear, contradictory or disconnected from the capabilities and resources available. Ultimately, an effective decision and an effective institution are two sides of the same coin: the decision needs an institution capable of carrying it out, and the institution needs a clear, stable decision in order to work effectively.
Conclusion
In short, public policy in Iraq is all but absent, and where it does exist its contours remain unclear. Public policy usually takes the form of plans and programmes of action carried out by the official public authority, that is, by government in its various centres. It cannot be separated from the broader context of comprehensive development, and there is near-consensus that development must be approached through a holistic understanding of public policy. Public policy is a multidimensional phenomenon, and some have likened it to a triangle whose base is political and whose two sides are economic and social. The Iraqi state is the exception. It has faced, and continues to face, deep structural and political complications. Rather than resting on three sides like other states, Iraq rests on six: the muhasasa quota system and consensus-based power-sharing; the multiplicity and fragmentation of decision-making centres; constitutional and legal problems; the impact of polarisation and external pressure; weak strategic thinking and a reliance on crisis management; and administrative and political corruption. Only once these deep-rooted problems have been resolved can we begin to talk about building a grand strategy for Iraq, and about designing, making, implementing and evaluating Iraqi policies that are integrated in every dimension and complete on every side.