Dr. Yassin Al-Bakri
Professor of Political Systems
College of Political Science, Al-Nahrain University
The withdrawal of US-led coalition forces from Iraq has reopened difficult questions about future shifts in power and authority. Does it give ‘the state’ an opportunity to reassert its legitimacy and legal authority over all armed factions? These factions rely on their weapons and the influence of a parallel deep state reinforced by external support. Alternatively, will events escalate sharply, reviving a politics and rhetoric of fear that amplify and spread public anxieties? Such an escalation could help destroy what remains of ‘the state’ or further marginalise it.
Moments of transition, when the balance of power shifts sharply, create vacuums and critical junctures. Whether these turn into opportunities or challenges depends on the calculations of actors who aspire to fill the vacuum, command the levers of influence and control, or shape decision-making. In Iraq, where power is spread across several centres, such moments open the door to competition and conflict while fuelling fears of chaos and strengthening those who would welcome it. Some may conclude that chaos and an uncertain future are unavoidable, or that they are simply the price of abrupt transitions.
The occupation of Iraq in 2003, the heavy-handed presence of American power and everything that followed produced a series of power shifts that repeatedly escaped control and developed into open conflict. Each episode altered the balance among rivals locked in a struggle for dominance, yet no one ever managed to settle that struggle decisively. These episodes include the sectarian war that followed the bombings of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra and the confrontations between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government and the Sadrist movement of the Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, which coincided with the growing role of armed factions. They also include the withdrawal of US forces in 2011, the advance of ISIS in 2014 and the formation of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) to confront it. Throughout this period, ‘the state’ was either an imagined goal or an instrument in the struggle. Its position remained fragile, and it proved unable to arbitrate and resolve the country’s political and social contradictions or to secure a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
At every one of these turning points, outside powers have played a central part in recalibrating or shifting Iraq’s balance of power, sometimes through a direct military presence or its withdrawal, and at other times through influence and control exercised by local instruments and proxies. The coalition’s withdrawal is therefore an important variable because it raises questions about national sovereignty, the ability of Iraqi institutions to manage security challenges, the limits of the influence wielded by political and armed actors, and the nature of Iraq’s regional and international relations.
The central question, then, is how the end of the international coalition’s military and advisory mission might reshape the balance of power and authority in Iraq, and which conditions will determine the direction of that shift.
Key Actors
1. The Central Government and State Institutions
The government draws its institutional legitimacy from a complicated electoral process. Objections have been raised against the constitutional interpretations used to form governments, at least since the announcement of the 2010 election results and the Federal Supreme Court’s ruling on which ‘largest bloc’ is entitled to form a government. Setting these objections aside, the government in theory holds the tools and authority of public administration and controls the country’s financial resources, in addition to bearing responsibility for foreign policy and national security. In practice, however, it has had to contend with partners in decision-making who have weakened its ability to turn constitutional powers into real authority. This lack of effectiveness reflects both weak institutional structures and the way positions are allocated, from the formation of the cabinet to key posts within each ministry. Governing coalitions tend to be assembled to secure parliamentary approval for the cabinet, without a genuine multiparty agreement on a shared programme for its term in office. As a result, there has always been a gap between the government’s programme on paper and what it actually does in practice.
Repeatedly, government programmes have lost credibility through neglect and been displaced by the demands of dominant forces to which the government has yielded. At best, the government becomes one centre of power among several. Some of these centres are armed and use their influence to pursue commercial interests and engage in economic extortion. Their conduct is presented in symbolic terms that place it beyond ordinary politics and the scrutiny to which all political action should be subject.
Successive governments have repeatedly found themselves in this impasse, and they have come to understand the root of their fragility. That fragility is inextricably linked to the existence of a parallel armed force. Such a force undermines the very idea of a state that holds a monopoly on legitimate force and takes decisions of war and peace alone. It also undercuts the state’s capacity to apply the law to everyone without fearing that some faction will respond by destabilising the country from within or damaging its relations with its neighbours.
The failure to monopolise decision-making and legitimate force sustains a political system that enables and protects corruption and permits the plunder of public wealth. It also prevents economic reform, leaving the economy exposed to recurring structural shocks during crises.
The agreement on the coalition’s withdrawal, and the fact that its timing was tied to the disarmament of armed groups, gave the government an opportunity to undercut the groups’ claim that Iraq is under occupation and that their weapons exist to liberate it. However, those who manufacture pretexts can readily create new ones and incorporate them into an ongoing narrative. Some of these pretexts are rooted in real events, while others spring directly from an imagination that invents new sacred causes, each of which justifies the continued weakening and hijacking of the state.
The new deadline for bringing all weapons under state control, 30 June 2027, remains contested, with tactical manoeuvres concealing broader strategies.
2. The Armed Groups
The presence of armed groups creates problems on more than one level. First, they undermine any reasonable conception of statehood by penetrating state structures and multiplying centres of decision-making, particularly on questions of war and peace. Experience has also shown that the government is unable to restrain their armed activity, which answers to considerations that reach beyond the interests of the state. Second, these groups are used as the guardians of a political order dominated by a single communal group, a role that appears to enjoy tacit acceptance under what has come to be known as al-hakimiyya, shorthand for the principle of Shia rule.
The domestic role these groups play has bred suspicion and objection among Iraq’s other political communities, namely the Sunni and Kurdish political forces. According to Sunni figures, these groups exercise considerable influence over Sunni-majority provinces. They have used it for electoral and economic gain and to redraw, or at least shape, the distribution of party power in those provinces.
In the Kurdistan Region, the effects are visible in armed attacks on Erbil, the regional capital, and the backing given to parties hostile to it. They also take the form of interference in areas of fragile stability such as Sinjar and efforts to stoke the crisis between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, the respective strongholds of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
The armed groups’ roles also extend beyond the domestic arena into the wider region, as part of what is known as the ‘Axis of Resistance’, the network formed by Iran and its allied armed groups across the Middle East. It is this regional role that sits at the centre of foreign demands for their disarmament, especially in light of the fallout from the US war on Iran. The pillars of Iranian power have also eroded, with Syria pulled out of Tehran’s sphere of influence and Hezbollah left weakened in southern Lebanon.
The broader picture of rival projects competing over the Middle East places Iraq’s armed groups squarely within the conditions set by the conflict between Washington and Tehran, which complicates any plan to disarm them through a purely domestic decision. The coalition’s withdrawal, moreover, redefines both threats and opportunities, and power calculations suggest that it has created more favourable conditions for the armed groups to reposition themselves.
Although the withdrawal may be read as an opportunity for the armed groups, the Iraqi state faces its own set of challenges. These include the conditions attached to reining in the groups and the gains that could accrue to the various components of the state as a reward for doing so. More important still are the warnings of various sanctions and the risk of open internal conflict. Tom Barrack, the US presidential envoy to Iraq, pointed to this risk when he spoke of the ‘Balkanisation’ of Iraq, a remark that amounted to a signal, a warning or a threat that the gains Shia political forces have accumulated since 2003 could be swept away.
3. The Governing Formula and Relations among Iraq’s Political Communities
A look back at relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region over the past two decades shows how the crisis between them has played out across a range of issues. Beneath the complexity of this relationship lies a disagreement over what form Iraq’s federal state should take.
Erbil regards federalism as an achievement to be preserved and strengthened. Some forces in Baghdad, by contrast, believe the arrangement is tilted in the Region’s favour, so much so that the constitutional founding period is at times described as an original sin that has to be revisited. For them, the remedy lies in hollowing out the substance of federalism and strengthening central control in practice by shifting the balance of power, ahead of any constitutional amendments, which Shia political actors know would be hard to achieve under the current constitutional framework.
The armed attacks on Erbil and the ongoing effort to inflame relations between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil serve as a tactic that undermines the Region’s ability to speak with one voice, to the benefit of those in Baghdad who seek greater centralisation.
Given the fraught relationship between Baghdad and Erbil, and the heavy-handed methods sometimes used to influence it, the coalition forces were regarded as one of Erbil’s security and political safeguards. Their withdrawal has therefore become a source of security and political anxiety, a concern voiced by Masoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, in a recently broadcast television interview.
On the Sunni side, the issue is seen as the crux of the imbalance in the governing formula. Sunnis lack a genuine share in political decision-making and are marginalised in decisions on security. Some Sunni leaders argue that Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Accountability and Justice Law, which governs de-Baathification, are used to compel Sunni political actors to submit. They add that armed groups are used to subdue Sunni areas, manipulate elections and control their outcomes through the groups’ grip on security in those provinces. Sunnis, furthermore, are unable to invoke a constitutional safeguard in the form of the right to establish federal regions, and anyone who raises the idea is met with accusations that leave them a choice between submission and political ruin.
The withdrawal of the international coalition creates a problem for Sunnis as well. The coalition was never the guarantor of Sunni security, but its departure leaves a vacuum in which armed actors can build up their strength in the Sunni-majority provinces. This, in turn, deepens the imbalance in the governing formula and pushes Sunnis further to the margins.
Possible Scenarios
1. Strengthening the State
The state strengthens its capacity to maintain security and dismantles the hybrid security order, which rests on parallel forces that present themselves as partners with a legitimate right to hold and use weapons according to their own assessment of risks and threats.
Under this scenario, the coalition’s withdrawal is seen as an opportunity, though one that depends on the measures and policies the government adopts to close security gaps. That means strengthening the institutional readiness of state bodies, including the security sector, through training, arming, and closer cooperation and coordination between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region. It also means deepening bilateral coordination with Iraq’s international partners and working to prevent political divisions by offering guarantees about how the state is run, so that no party is marginalised.
Keeping Iraq clear of the fallout from the US-Iranian war is a priority, given the dangers posed by the armed groups’ involvement in that war.
In any case, disarming the groups lies at the heart of strengthening the state, and the coalition’s withdrawal removes the armed groups’ pretexts, at least in theory.
On this issue, the government needs procedures in place to pursue parallel tracks that combine dialogue with legal and security tools.
2. Preserving the Fragile Balance
Power is redistributed only partially and the fragile balance holds. From the perspective of political actors, the coalition’s withdrawal then offers little opportunity and poses little threat, and political actors continue to rely on minimal consensus to preserve the system in its hybrid form.
This scenario poses a long-term threat to a political system that already suffers from widespread institutional weakness. The system also faces acute financial and economic crises rooted in its reliance on oil rents and public-sector hiring that adds no real value, together with a persistent failure to diversify the economy.
3. Deepening the Imbalance of Power
The imbalance of power deepens and the bare-minimum consensus breaks down. This scenario starts from the view held by some actors that the coalition’s withdrawal is a chance to extend their hold over the state’s key institutions and fill security vacuums at the expense of the state’s own capabilities.
This scenario would become more likely if dialogue failed to secure the armed groups’ disarmament by the 30 June 2027 deadline and the government proved too weak to use legal and security measures. Sharper political divisions, fuelled by doubts about the effectiveness of dialogue, would increase that likelihood. A critical escalation in regional insecurity would have the same effect. Whether such an escalation occurs will depend on the course and outcome of the war and any agreement that emerges from it.
This final scenario does not necessarily make chaos a foregone conclusion. Even so, it could contribute to the unravelling of the state’s image and push the state itself to the brink.
