Position Assessment
Dr. Basil Hussein
Head of Kulwatha Centre for Studies and Measurement of Iraqi Public Opinion
1. This assessment takes as its starting point the credibility of deterrence and the need to reshape the calculations of adversaries. Once the withdrawal is complete, the stated justification for factional armament disappears, and the government faces a straightforward test of whether it can assert its authority. If, however, the withdrawal is followed by settlements that lock in permanent autonomy for armed groups, the likely reading will be that armed pressure worked, and that holding on to weapons delivers more than submitting to the state ever could.
2. The challenge extends beyond the weapons themselves. What makes the factions a structural problem is their ability to block political decisions, protect their revenue streams, and place themselves beyond accountability. Disarmament, properly understood, is therefore a redistribution of power within the Iraqi system. Any effort that stops at clearing stockpiles while leaving command networks, financing channels, and coercion apparatus untouched will simply allow armed capability to reconstitute itself the moment conditions permit.
3. In formations where leadership, resources, and loyalties are shared between the Popular Mobilisation Forces and the factions, drawing a clean line between the two is close to impossible. Factional commanders who hold influential positions inside the PMF give their organisations a gateway to state resources and institutional cover. The real question for each formation is not its formal label but who actually issues its orders and whether the government can replace or discipline its leadership. Official designation, on its own, proves nothing about unity of authority.
4. Al-Zaidi has, on this assessment, made commitments that outrun his current ability to deliver. His political survival depends on parties that may well see the success of his programme as a direct threat to their interests. The core dilemma is this, the same forces that give him his parliamentary majority can withdraw their executive cooperation the moment reform measures approach their own resources or leadership. The government's survival and the success of its agenda could therefore pull in opposite directions.
5. The risk assessment must account for the possibility that some Iraqi forces will not carry out al-Zaidi's orders when he acts as commander-in-chief. Certain commands or units may hesitate, whether out of fear of a direct confrontation with Iran-linked factions, concern about retaliation, or the expectation that no political protection will follow once they have acted. This is a real possibility that demands careful evaluation, though it should not be projected onto the military establishment as a whole or treated as a settled fact.
6. There is a further dimension to obedience that turns on expectations rather than orders. A commander who believes the government may back down, or trade him away in a future bargain, while the armed party retains its full capacity for punishment, has every incentive to delay or comply only partially. Credible legal and institutional protection for those who carry out enforcement is therefore not a secondary concern but a precondition for unity of command. No amount of administrative directives can substitute for it.
7. Government strength should be judged not by what it has on paper but by what it can execute in a coherent and sustained fashion. Numerical superiority counts for little if intelligence pipelines or supply chains break down, or if the chain of command splits at the moment it is tested. The immediate priority is to map the capability gaps the withdrawal will leave behind, ensure continuity of the functions that matter, and verify that institutions can carry out sensitive decisions without partisan interference or leaks that compromise the operation before it begins.
8. Settlement negotiations carry an inherent risk, namely that they become a device for running down the clock with no genuine intention of surrendering arms. The armed party could use the process to ease the pressure on itself, and wait for a change of government or a shift in external priorities. Delay turns into a strategic asset once the armed party's capability holds steady while the government's credibility frays and its partners lose interest in the file.
9. Seriousness in negotiations cannot be measured by public statements or by whether meetings continue to take place. It can only be inferred from a willingness to accept measures that materially restrict the freedom to use weapons, including verifiable disclosure of capabilities, the transfer of control over portions of them, and safeguards against their movement between organisations. When one side insists on deferring every concrete commitment until the very end of the process, it is collecting the benefits of negotiation without paying any of the costs.
10. Negotiations need clearly defined stages and publicly stated conditions for any extension. Every extension must be justified by demonstrated progress, not by fresh promises. The consequences of non-compliance must be enforceable in practice, otherwise deadlines become repeated demonstrations of the government's inability to act. A threat that is never followed through may do worse than nothing, for it gives the other side hard information about the limits of the government's will and encourages further defiance.
11. Seen through the lens of Iranian forward defence, Iraq may represent the last advanced position before Iranian strategic depth is directly exposed, particularly if Tehran's other spheres of influence contract. The armed independence of the factions may accordingly be regarded by Tehran as a deterrence and leverage asset it cannot afford to lose. Confining weapons therefore touches on regional security architecture, not only on domestic politics, and requires a realistic reckoning with the external patron's ability to obstruct implementation or rebuild what has been dismantled.
12. These calculations are inevitably shaped by the trajectory of the American-Iranian confrontation. Yet a détente between the two may well produce an agreement that halts attacks on American assets while leaving factional military capability inside Iraq untouched. Baghdad must therefore hold firm on standards of unified command, transparent financing, and accountability, so that quiet on the external front is not allowed to substitute for the restoration of sovereign authority at home. The absence of attacks over a stretch of months does not, in itself, prove that the independent capacity to resume them has been dissolved.
13. International complacency sends a clear signal, namely that foot-dragging works and that the commitment to confine weapons can be indefinitely postponed. Correcting that signal requires a consistent stance that ties political and economic support to measurable outcomes while shielding the institutions charged with delivering them. Asking the government to take politically expensive steps and then leaving it exposed at the first sign of pushback only strengthens the hand of those within the state apparatus who argue against action.
14. American sanctions or financial restrictions remain available as a tool for pressing the pace of implementation. Yet if the pressure weakens the state's capacity to pay salaries and keep its institutions running, it risks empowering the very forces it is meant to curb. The costs must be directed at illicit financing networks and shadow influence structures, with a clear pathway for relief once compliance is demonstrated. The purpose is to change behaviour and shrink the capacity to paralyse the state, not to hollow out the state itself.
15. Neighbouring states will not take Baghdad's assurances on trust as long as threats continue to originate from Iraqi soil. If Iraq fails to respond, those states could resort to protective and deterrent measures that bypass the government altogether and eat into its sovereignty. Preventing cross-border attacks and holding the perpetrators accountable is therefore a matter of direct Iraqi national interest. Tangible progress on this front can be translated into economic and security partnerships that reinforce the state's staying power.
16. The confrontation must not be allowed to overlap with a widespread livelihood crisis. When salaries stall and services collapse, public support for the government drains away and the factions gain an opening to present their armed presence as inseparable from the community's welfare. Sound policy means protecting core fiscal commitments, shutting down illicit spending, and funding a credible professional transition for demobilised fighters. Absorbing formations in bulk, with their existing command structures and bloc loyalties intact, must be avoided, since it transplants their organisational independence into the heart of the state's institutions.
17. Partial compliance is the most likely equilibrium so long as the factions can hold on to their sources of power while offering only token concessions in return. That equilibrium breaks when the government acquires the capacity to enforce its decisions, protect those who carry them out, verify the transfer of weapons, and punish non-compliance in a predictable way. The decisive test is whether the government can enforce an order that cuts against the interests of a powerful organisation and sustain that enforcement after the organisation pushes back. Only at that point does it become possible to judge whether the authority of the commander-in-chief is genuinely operative or merely conditional on the consent of the forces it is supposed to command.