Exclusive Interview with Sheikh Khamees Al-Khanjar

1. Why is there so much controversy around your name? Whenever the name Sheikh Khamees Al-Khanjar comes up, it sparks widespread debate in political and media circles. That was true while you were living abroad, and it is still true now that you are back in Iraq. Some see you as a pragmatist who knows how to hold a delicate balance; others see you as someone bent on confrontation. Why do you think your name draws this much controversy, and why are you still at the heart of the political struggle?

Controversy isn’t always a bad thing. Sometimes it’s a sign of an active presence, one that refuses to go along with the status quo or get drawn into the traditional game of political balancing. When you’re not the product of a closed system, and nobody in the corridors of power is pulling your strings, you automatically find yourself under constant scrutiny from all sides. Some people see your independence as a danger and your frankness as a threat, so they portray you as someone bent on confrontation, even when you’re the one calling for common ground.

I didn’t choose controversy; it chose me, from the moment I decided to say “no” when silence was the easier path.

While I was abroad, I was accused of having distanced myself. At home, I became a point of contention because I refused to box myself into any closed camp. Instead, I tried to open the way to relationships with everyone, grounded in candor and clarity.

And I may well stay that way, because I never chose the comfortable route in politics. I chose the harder one, which means balancing principle with realism and loyalty with flexibility, and representing your base without becoming hostage to other people’s fears. Controversy is the natural price of refusing to work in the shadows.

2. How do you see the period after the international coalition forces withdraw on September 30, at the end of this month?

We don’t look at the period after September 30 only in terms of whether foreign forces stay or leave. For us, the issue is bigger than the international coalition’s presence. The real question is: what happens to the Iraqi state after that?

If the end of the coalition’s mission marks Iraq’s transition to a fully sovereign state, one with sole authority over war and peace and a monopoly on arms, then that is a natural course, and it is where Iraq should be heading. But if the coalition leaves while weapons remain outside the state’s authority, and armed groups keep making their own political and security decisions beyond the reach of the constitutional institutions while staying tied to regional axes, then we will have ended one problem only to be left with an even more dangerous one.

Sovereignty can’t be selective. It makes no sense to demand that foreign forces leave while Iraq’s decisions remain exposed to the influence of another country, or to armed groups that don’t fully answer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

What we want after September 30 is an Iraq that doesn’t need foreign forces but, at the same time, doesn’t bow to Iran or to any other country, and doesn’t allow any faction or party to build up enough power to challenge the authority of the state.

For us, the real test of the post-coalition period isn’t how many foreign troops leave Iraq. It’s whether the Iraqi state can say clearly: one authority over weapons, one security command and a foreign policy made in Baghdad alone.

3. What about disarming the armed factions? Do you believe they will really comply with the demand for a state monopoly on weapons and give up their arms?

I seriously doubt the factions will give up their weapons of their own accord. Everything we’ve seen in politics tells us that no group with weapons, influence and far-reaching interests lets go of them easily just because an appeal has been made or a political deal has been signed.

For us, this isn’t a negotiation that can go on indefinitely. A state isn’t really a state if armed groups can still impose facts on the ground outside its official institutions.

What’s required is clear: all weapons under the authority of the state, a single security and military command, and institutions that don’t have to compete with parallel armed structures.

Any group that rejects this is effectively setting itself against the very principle of statehood and the rule of law.

My position rests on actions, not promises. If these factions want to prove they are committed to the state, the test is simple: hand over the weapons, submit fully to the official institutions and stop making any military decisions independently of the government.

4. Where would the Sunni political forces stand if the armed factions insisted on keeping their weapons and refused to accept the principle of a state monopoly on arms?

Our position as Sunni political forces is clear: we will not accept Iraq continuing to be run on a formula in which one armed party stands above the state while every other Iraqi is expected to make do with the law and the institutions.

If the factions insist on keeping their weapons and refuse to submit fully to the authority of the state, there can be no talk of a balanced political partnership or of a state with real sovereignty. It’s unacceptable for political forces to run in elections with one hand while holding a gun in the other.

We stand for a state where weapons are in the hands of the official forces alone and everyone is subject to the law, without exception. Any insistence on keeping weapons outside the state will deepen the crisis of trust between Iraq’s communities and reduce all the talk of national partnership to an empty slogan.

We will not accept Sunnis, Kurds or any other Iraqis being left defenseless in the face of a political party that holds both weapons and influence.

Either we have a state that treats everyone as equals, or the imbalance will remain, no matter how many governments come and go.

5. Sunni political forces are visibly fragmented, and that has cost them influence at decisive moments. Do you see any prospect of the Sunnis speaking with one voice, or has infighting become a built-in feature of the community’s politics?

Sunni divisions are part of a wider picture. The split among the Shia is bigger than anything you’ll find among the Sunnis, and the Kurdish scene is divided as well. So the Sunni case isn’t an exception. As I said, it’s part of that wider picture.

We’re now working quietly through the National Political Council, which brings together the main Sunni political forces. It’s built on competence and complementarity, and on dividing up roles instead of fighting over them. Without a doubt, the biggest challenge lies not with our rivals but within ourselves.

If we can rise above narrow self-interest, we can restore both the community’s standing and the strength of its institutions.

6. How do you view Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government?

We view Mr. Ali al-Zaidi’s government with a great deal of confidence and hope. We believe it has a real opportunity to set a different course in running the state, to strengthen the rule of law, to improve services and to deal seriously with the economic and security issues where people are waiting to see tangible results.

On a personal level, I see Mr. al-Zaidi as calm and level-headed, a good listener who is open to dialogue and has a strong sense of responsibility. What gives me reason for optimism is that he avoids political showmanship and makes a point of dealing with issues in a practical way, while staying open to all of the country’s political forces and communities.

We’re confident in his ability to lead the country through this period, and his government can deliver something different if it’s able to work free of pressure and narrow interests and put Iraq’s interests above all else.

We support every step the government takes to strengthen the authority and sovereignty of the state, reinforce its institutions, improve people’s lives and move the country toward stability and reform.

For all our optimism, we know the challenges are considerable and the road won’t be easy. But we hope the government will have the political will and the ability to make tough decisions and turn its promises into results Iraqis can see and feel.

7. How do you assess the economic challenges facing Iraq, especially the fallout from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz brought on by the escalating conflict between the United States and Iran? What does this mean for the Iraqi economy, and for the country’s ability to export oil and maintain financial stability?

I think the economic challenge Iraq faces today extends beyond the question of whether oil prices rise or fall. The real problem is that our economy still relies heavily on a single resource, and that resource in turn relies on one main export route. Higher oil prices don’t automatically mean more revenue for Iraq if the oil can’t be exported, or if shipping and insurance costs go up and it has to be sold at steep discounts. That’s exactly what happened during the Hormuz disruptions. Shipping traffic dropped sharply, and Iraq was forced into costlier export arrangements and had to sell some cargoes at deep discounts.

There’s no question the Hormuz crisis has laid that fragility bare. Oil prices may shoot up, but what good is that to Iraq if it can’t export its usual volumes, or has to pay exceptional shipping and insurance costs, or has to sell its oil at a discount just to get it to market?

That’s why we shouldn’t look at the price per barrel on its own, but at the net revenue that actually makes it into the Iraqi treasury.

This hits the federal budget directly, because the state has heavy obligations to meet: salaries, pensions, services and projects. Even before the current crisis, the International Monetary Fund had warned that rising spending and the budget’s dependence on oil had left Iraq more exposed to oil and financing shocks.

Therefore I believe the crisis has to be handled on two parallel tracks.

First, in the short term, we need to protect salaries, basic services and the social safety net, review nonessential spending and preserve our reserves. We must not try to cover any deficit through unchecked monetary financing, because that could turn a revenue crisis into an inflation problem and put pressure on the dinar and on those reserves.

Second, in the medium and long term, the Hormuz crisis should change Iraq’s whole approach to exporting oil. A country with oil reserves on this scale can’t go on depending heavily on a single sea route. We need to move quickly to expand export capacity through the Turkish port of Ceyhan, build pipelines linking the south to the north, and look seriously at developing the western route through Syria to the Mediterranean.

The government has already started moving in this direction, but what we need now is to turn those steps into permanent export infrastructure that can handle large volumes. Trucking oil out by road can work as a stopgap, but it’s no substitute for pipelines. And we need to get the Basra-Aqaba pipeline off the ground.

Then there’s the deeper problem: diversifying the economy itself. Iraq can’t go through every regional crisis wondering how it will pay salaries if oil exports are disrupted. We need to raise non-oil revenue, reform customs and taxes, boost the private sector and turn the gas we currently waste into electricity and economic value here at home.

As I see it, the Hormuz crisis isn’t only about oil transit. It’s an economic wake-up call for Iraq. The immediate answer is to manage liquidity and revenue carefully. The strategic answer is to open up more export routes and then gradually reduce the state’s own dependence on oil.

If we come out of this crisis still relying on one route and one resource, we’ll only have postponed the next crisis instead of dealing with it.

8. There’s a gap between traditional politicians and a new generation that has grown angrier and less patient. How are you dealing with that?

This angry generation is the real hope for reform, not a threat to it.

We’re not looking to hold on to our place on the political scene forever. We’re working to empower this generation, to give it a platform to express its vision, and to let it lead the battle of building the state with a fresh approach.

We’ve opened the door to a number of talented young people, and we’ll keep doing so, not as election-season window dressing but as a real change in the way we approach politics. Young people have every right to lead, to make mistakes and learn from them, instead of standing on the sidelines waiting their turn.

9. What is your position on attacks by Iran-aligned armed factions against neighboring Arab countries?

My position is very clear. What interest does Iraq have in attacking Saudi Arabia, the UAE or any other Arab country? What do ordinary Iraqis gain from seeing their country turned into a launchpad for missiles and drones aimed at countries with which we share fraternal ties and wide-ranging economic, political and security interests?

In my judgment, any faction that uses Iraqi territory to attack neighboring countries is not acting in Iraq’s interest. These attacks serve regional agendas and conflicts that have nothing to do with the people of Iraq, and it is Iraq that pays the price first, even before the country under attack.

We’ve seen how operations like these can drag Iraq into diplomatic crises, invite military retaliation and threaten its economic interests. They can even leave the state answerable to its neighbors for actions its own institutions never authorized. The Iraqi government has officially rejected the use of Iraqi territory or airspace to attack Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan or any other country, and it has opened investigations into these attacks.

No armed faction should be able to decide on its own who Iraq’s enemies and friends are, or to drag nearly 50 million Iraqis into a war that parliament never voted for and the government never declared. Decisions of war and peace must rest with the state alone.

As for our relations with Arab countries, they are no side issue. We share trade, investment, energy, borders, common interests and regional security. Sabotaging those relationships for the sake of calculations tied to Iran’s conflict with the United States, or with other countries in the region, means, in my view, putting other people’s interests ahead of Iraq’s.

That’s why we need to take a firm stand. Iraq is not a battleground for proxy wars, and its territory is not a place for others to settle their scores. Anyone who carries weapons inside Iraq must answer to the state. And anyone who wants to fight a war on behalf of a regional project has no right to fight it in Iraq’s name or from Iraqi soil.

10. In your view, what will it take to bring stability to Iraq?

Stability in Iraq won’t come from slogans or from positions taken for the moment. It will come from an integrated approach that rebuilds the country from within, on the basis of reconciliation and shared interests. What I mean is building a web of overlapping interests among all of Iraq’s communities, so that stability becomes something Iraqis have a collective stake in at home before it becomes a demand from abroad. Once the communities’ national interests are bound up with one another, other countries will find they have to support Iraq’s stability, not out of courtesy, but to preserve the country’s internal balance.

Beyond that, there can be no real stability without the rule of law and a single center of decision-making, above all on security. There is no security when decisions are made in several places at once, and no stability when loyalties are divided. The power to decide on war and peace must lie with the state alone, not with factions or groups that put themselves above the constitution.

In short, Iraq’s stability starts from within and has to rest on a clear foundation: an Iraq united by a shared destiny and governed by reason, not by a struggle for dominance.

Building a broad network of regional and international interests, founded on real partnership, will also encourage stability, because other countries will see that supporting a stable Iraq is a way of safeguarding their own interests there.