Iraq at a Crossroads: Lost Time and Squandered Opportunities in Confronting Crises

Date:

Hasan Turan

Former Chairman of the Turkmen Front

The Iraqi government was formed after a protracted and difficult process that exceeded the constitutional deadlines for government formation. It took shape amid tense regional conditions, and against the backdrop of a severe economic and security crisis brought on by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the consequent halt of Iraqi oil exports through the Gulf. Given that nearly ninety per cent of Iraq's oil leaves through that route, the disruption dealt a direct blow to the country's hard-currency revenues. The government also entered office at a time when numerous Iraqi sites had come under bombardment, and when relations with several neighbouring states were charged with friction.

It should be acknowledged that every government formed since 2003 has passed through difficult and complex stages. Yet the failure to achieve any tangible progress in the broader political process, twenty-three years after the fall of the former regime, raises serious questions about the commitment of the political system to building a state of functioning institutions. Such a state would need to be capable of managing the successive crises that have shaken the region, mitigating the risks the country faces, and delivering political, security, and economic stability in an environment that has tested most of the world's governments.

The failure to treat time as the strategic resource it is, and to invest it in institution-building, speaks to a deeper indifference toward laying solid foundations for the Iraqi state. That indifference has led Iraq into challenges of a scale and severity that could have been avoided. Reviewing every neglected issue would require far more space than a single article allows. Several issues affecting all segments of Iraqi society deserve particular attention. They illustrate the neglect of successive administrations and its consequences for every Iraqi, now and in the future.

On the economic front, Iraq depends on oil exports for the bulk of its federal revenues. Oil is the primary engine of the national economy, funding both the operational and investment budgets and underwriting whatever stability the population enjoys. However, recent events have exposed an alarming degree of neglect in developing this sector, despite its critical importance. If the oil sector itself has been allowed to stagnate, the implication for less prominent sectors is clear: neglect there has been far worse.

Despite all the years that have passed, Iraq still lacks a functioning pipeline network capable of moving crude between its available export outlets. The closure of a single outlet was enough to cut exports by more than ninety per cent. The strategic Basra-to-Haditha line has been out of service for over twenty years. The export routes running toward Syria and Saudi Arabia are completely shut down. The Iraqi-Turkish line via Fishkhabour remains inoperative, even though nine years have passed since the provinces it traverses were liberated from the control of ISIS. Exports through the Kurdistan Region's pipeline are limited to oil from the Kirkuk fields and the Region's own fields, with no spare capacity to move Basra crude. It is worth recalling that this same pipeline was used to export both Kirkuk and Basra oil from the 1980s until 2003.

Crude oil is also an essential feedstock for the petrochemical industry, offering Iraq an opportunity to broaden its economic base by producing materials in high global demand, fertilisers among them. Old petrochemical plants exist in Baiji and Basra, yet the industry has seen no meaningful development. Had investment been directed toward it over the past two decades, Iraq would have generated substantial additional revenues and created employment for thousands of workers.

A similar pattern of neglect is evident in the refining sector. Iraq has failed to build modern refineries capable of producing petroleum derivatives such as petrol, gas oil, and kerosene, forcing the country to import these products annually from its neighbours. The contrast is stark. Iraq sits on one of the largest oil reserves in the world, yet it spends hard currency importing materials that could readily be produced at home, given that the basic raw material is already in the ground.

The situation with associated gas and the country's undeveloped gas fields is no less troubling. Associated gas continues to be flared on a massive scale, damaging the environment and the health of residents in oil-producing areas, all while Iraq imports gas to run its power stations. This record demands accountability from every individual who has managed the Ministry of Oil. They must explain why associated gas has not been captured and fields such as Mansouriya and Akkas have not been developed, despite twenty-three years of opportunity and the continuing drain on hard-currency reserves caused by gas imports.

According to the World Bank, Iraq flared approximately 17.7 billion cubic metres of gas during 2023, or 16.3 billion cubic metres if flaring in the Kurdistan Region, whose oil sector operates with a degree of independence, is excluded. This placed Iraq third globally, behind only Russia and Iran.

The International Energy Agency's Global Methane Tracker report for 2025 adds a further dimension. Iraq lost an estimated 3.3 billion cubic metres of methane during 2024 through venting, leakage, and incomplete combustion in gas flares. Taken together, these losses indicate that Iraq could capture up to 21 billion cubic metres of additional gas, representing a revenue opportunity estimated at approximately 3.8 billion dollars annually.

Had a large part of this gas been captured, it could have been used to fuel power-generation stations that currently run at low efficiency on fuel oil, diesel, or crude oil, while also generating revenue from the extracted natural gas liquids. Instead, Iraq continues to operate its power stations below their design capacity using polluting liquid fuel, and it remains dependent on gas and electricity imports from Iran at elevated prices, even after the cancellation in February 2025 of the American exemptions that had permitted those energy purchases.

Iraq has also announced plans to deploy two floating storage units for liquefied natural gas, with the aim of beginning imports during 2025 to supplement gas supplies for electricity generation. Beyond LNG imports, the country currently relies on imported petrochemicals and other derivative products that could be manufactured domestically. Developing that production capacity would reduce import dependence while simultaneously supporting the growth of industrial sectors that require stable natural gas supplies.

Until recently, Iraq had completed only one world-class project aimed at reducing gas flaring: the Basra Gas Company. The company reports a processing capacity of approximately one billion standard cubic feet per day, equivalent to 10.3 billion cubic metres annually. That is a significant volume, yet it falls well short of the target set at the company's founding in 2011, which envisaged double that figure. The company also failed to achieve one of its original objectives, the construction of a liquefied natural gas export plant. The three fields that feed the company continue to flare large quantities of gas. World Bank data indicate that 5.8 billion cubic metres were flared in 2023, while the firm Capterio estimates the figure at approximately 4.6 billion cubic metres in 2024.

More broadly, the development of oil facilities and ministerial infrastructure falls short of expectations. Some sectors under the ministry have not undergone any genuine modernisation, and investment in training the workforce has consistently fallen short of what is needed. The oil refinery in Kirkuk province, which continues to operate to this day, dates back to the late 1940s and still relies on the technology of that era.

The Ministry of Oil does not own a dedicated fleet for transporting crude oil, a gap that became apparent through published reports. This deprives Iraq of the opportunity to capture a greater share of the value from its own exports, particularly as shipping costs through the Strait of Hormuz have risen. By comparison, Iran operates between forty-five and sixty oil tankers, and Saudi Arabia owns eighty-three. Before 2003, Iraq itself maintained a fleet of tankers for precisely this purpose.

If neglect is this pronounced in the oil sector, which forms the backbone of the Iraqi economy, then the squandering of Iraq's geographic position is equally consequential. Iraq has a natural advantage as a potential corridor for trade and energy flows between the Gulf states and Europe via Turkey, yet the steps it has taken to realise that advantage have been timid and fall far short of a strategic vision capable of redirecting a portion of global commerce through its territory.

Iraq and Turkey have signed agreements paving the way for the Development Road, a transport link connecting the two countries, with Emirati and Qatari involvement formalised in Baghdad. Yet tangible progress on the ground remains stalled. The issue also extends beyond the completion of al-Faw Port. The railway network could have been developed and linked to Turkey via the al-Kask-to-Ovaköy route. The World Bank, before the fall of the Assad regime, presented Iraq with an offer to connect the railway network in Nineveh province to the Turkish Ovaköy crossing, but the Ministry of Transport took no concrete steps to implement it.

Turkey has also repeatedly proposed activating container trade under the TIR system from Europe and Turkey to the Gulf states via the Arar crossing. Several rounds of meetings were held in Ankara and Baghdad, yet Iraqi approval was never secured, owing to disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region over the distribution of transit fees. As a result, Iraq lost an opportunity to earn millions of dollars in revenue. These funds could have supported infrastructure development and improvements to the road network between Zakho and the Arar crossing on the Iraqi-Saudi border.

When economic opportunities are left unexploited, trade shifts to alternative routes. This is what happened. Container trade shifted from the Turkey-Iraq-Saudi Arabia corridor to the Turkey-Syria-Jordan-Saudi Arabia corridor, and both Syria and Jordan have benefited from the diversion, particularly during the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, capturing significant returns from the movement of goods. There is now serious discussion of building a railway network and pipelines for oil and gas along the same route, connecting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to Turkey and the European Union.

Persisting with this approach will leave the current government, and every government that follows it, facing challenges beyond its capacity to manage. The approach combines squandered opportunities in a rentier economy, an inflated operational budget, and a chronic failure to manage the energy sector and invest its resources. This government in particular bears the responsibility of changing the economic trajectory through a series of difficult but necessary measures. The objective must be to reduce the impact of the crises sweeping the region and to convert their threats into opportunities, by establishing multiple export routes for energy, diversifying sources of income, making effective use of Iraq's geographic position, creating employment for young people instead of expanding government payrolls, and combating the corruption and party-linked economic offices that waste public funds and obstruct genuine development in favour of individuals or political factions.

All those responsible for the political process must recognise that Iraq today stands at a genuine crossroads. Successive crises and the neglect of vital sectors have brought the country to a point where correcting the mistakes of the past is no longer a matter of choice but a national necessity. Iraq must make these corrections to engage with the global economy and avoid remaining on its margins as mounting challenges affect every dimension of the state and society.