Exclusive Interview with Osama al-Nujaifi

Date:

Osama al-Nujaifi

Former Speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives

Iraq Dynamics Center (IDC) conducted this exclusive interview with Osama al-Nujaifi, former Speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives (2010–2014) and Vice President of Iraq. He is Secretary-General of the Mutahidoon (United) Party. Drawing on his experience leading Iraq’s parliament, al-Nujaifi assesses the record of the post-2003 political system and the prospects for institutional reform. The discussion examines elections, state sovereignty, armed factions and Iranian influence, alongside the concerns of the Sunni community, divisions among its political representatives, the question of federal regions and Nineveh’s future.

1. You assumed the speakership of the Council of Representatives at one of the most complex political junctures since 2003. How do you assess your personal experience at the head of parliament? What were your main achievements, and what challenges did you face?

In truth, I would rather not speak about my own role. Even so, friends and foes alike, near and far, know well that the second term of the Iraqi Council of Representatives stood out under my leadership. This was evident in the number of laws it passed. It was equally evident in the active role parliament played in confronting the mistakes of the executive and its attempts to encroach on the other branches of government. We believed that serving our people required statesmen ready to make sacrifices for these goals.

The road was not easy, however. Its challenges were many and serious, and the repeated assassination attempts against me and the leaders working alongside me were not even the greatest of them. Our deep commitment to serving the people, and to honest work free of exploitation, ran up against obstacles. At their root lay the fact that influential parties did not believe in an independent national approach. This seriously hampered the process of reform and rebuilding that I did my utmost to advance.

2. More than two decades after the current political system came into being, do you believe it has learned from its mistakes, or is it still reproducing them?

The problem with the political system is that, twenty-three years after its creation, it has not learned from the experience of governing that followed the fall of the former regime.

A system that fails to learn from experience is, among other things, unworthy of it.

Several factors have kept these mistakes recurring. They begin with the loopholes in the constitution and the way it was drafted, and they extend to the failure to move from an opposition mindset to one focused on building the state. As a result, the mistakes have grown like a snowball, which gets larger the further it rolls while the chances of reversing course grow slimmer.

For this reason, failure is a description that no one can deny. Its signs are easy to see in every public service that touches citizens’ lives and their future.

3. What was the greatest flaw in building the state after 2003? And can a stable state be built on sectarian rule or on the identity of a single community?

Through our political work, and in documented statements, meetings and conferences, we have clearly identified the crises and their causes. We have also set out how to defuse them and reach solutions by strengthening an inclusive national identity. However, all of this collided with a mentality that has not overcome its complexes. That mentality has failed to grasp that good governance demands sacrifices and certain conditions. The most important of these is that beliefs, religions, sects and ethnicities all deserve full respect, yet clinging to any one of them is no recipe for building a state.

Indeed, talk of Shia rule is nothing more than a way of tearing the country apart. Our partners in government must recognize the depth of this failure and learn from it, rather than wait for outcomes that will not serve Iraqis.

4. Given these imbalances, is reform from within the political system still possible?

Reform, and the work toward it, is always necessary. However, it requires forces that believe in it and are capable of bringing about the change we seek. The current situation, with all its repercussions, does not give us the confidence to say that this can be achieved.

5. Can we speak today of a complete democracy, with elections that are truly capable of changing who holds power and correcting the state’s course?

Talk of a fully functioning democracy, with fair elections held under a just law and carried out with precision, is pure illusion.

We remain very far from achieving any of this. Although the constitution leaves considerable room for democratic practice, many of its articles and provisions have never been implemented, and the laws needed to give them effect have yet to be passed. Moreover, the constitution has been applied selectively, according to the wishes of those who hold power.

The electoral law, for its part, has been redrafted several times without meeting voters’ aspirations. Meanwhile, the Political Parties Law remains frozen, particularly the provisions dealing with parties that have armed factions. This exposes the law’s credibility to serious challenges and doubts.

In light of all this, elections have failed to deliver any progress the public can feel. Instead, they keep repeating themselves, producing only marginal changes that mean very little.

6. Who makes decisions in Iraq today? Do the constitutional institutions still have the final say, or is decision-making spread across several centers of power?

No single body can be identified as responsible for Iraqi decision-making. Routine decisions fall to the constitutional institutions, while important ones are subject to consensus among the political forces. Some are shaped to meet the conditions of armed groups, and others are subject to foreign influence.

As a result, every decision has its own source of authority. Without that backing, it will stall, whether at the drafting stage or at the vote.

7. Some argue that talk of weapons outside state control has become a catch-all description that fails to distinguish between the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the armed factions. How do you view this relationship, and where does the state’s authority begin and end?

There is genuine ambiguity surrounding the PMF and the armed factions. The two still overlap, and the state’s control over weapons remains in doubt.

As a result, uncontrolled weapons have become a real threat to state sovereignty.

Their use has also become a double burden. The armed factions answer to a decision-making authority that is not Iraqi, yet some of these factions sit within the PMF, where they receive weapons and salaries from the state. All of this ambiguity calls for serious solutions. Without them, the very concept of sovereignty will continue to be gravely violated.

8. In your view, how extensive is Iranian influence in Iraq? Has it reached the point of directly shaping the formation of governments and sovereign decisions?

Iranian influence in Iraq is a fact that everyone knows and no one can hide. Iran has armed factions that owe it loyalty and obedience, and it carries great weight in forming governments and selecting key leaders. Furthermore, it commands a dangerous media apparatus that spans dozens of satellite channels, radio stations and publications of various kinds. It also wields clear sectarian sway and economic dominance.

All of this, along with much else, confirms the reach of Iran’s influence, which poses a serious threat to the country’s sovereignty and interests.

9. Given this reality, do you believe Iraq is truly ready to end the presence of the international coalition forces and take full responsibility for defending its security and sovereignty?

I believe an objective assessment, grounded in a deep commitment to the people’s interests, is lacking. This is because the forces running the country’s political process differ in their orientations and allegiances. They are at odds with one another and cannot agree. They also yield, directly or indirectly, to external dictates, as well as to slogans that carry no real substance one can rely on.

This means that the withdrawal of the coalition forces is premature.

These troops came at Iraq’s invitation after the terrorist group ISIS broke through the country’s defenses at the time. Iraq lacks the means to seriously defend its airspace, territory or vital interests, especially now that others have encroached upon it. Moreover, the state remains unable, even now, to rein in the activities of non-state actors, whether in terms of uncontrolled weapons, economic activity or ideological allegiance.

10. If these crises continue without real solutions, what scenarios could Iraq face in the future?

We do not consider any one scenario more likely than another. Every possibility depends on circumstances that cannot be controlled unless the mistakes are addressed with a national spirit and a will free of allegiance to any party. Collapse, division, uncontrolled weapons and the economic situation are all central threats that no party or individual can afford to ignore. Each of them demands strong and dedicated statesmen to confront it, and that remains an unfulfilled goal to this day.

11. Let us turn to the Sunni political house. Why did no organized Sunni political forces emerge before 2003, and how did that change after the fall of the former regime?

Before the 2003 occupation, Sunni political forces were not organized, with the exception of the Islamist parties. This is because the Sunni community has generally regarded the state and its institutions as its primary point of reference.

After the occupation, however, and once the constitution had been drafted in the form it took, the emergence of new parties and organizations became inevitable. Their first goal was to defend the community’s rights, driven by a deep sense that its partners in government were persisting in marginalizing it and monopolizing the state’s resources.

Unfortunately, these emerging forces were dealt with on several levels. Some were courted with the lure of personal gain and privilege, while national forces with a clear project and an independent approach were targeted. Former officials such as Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, Nineveh Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi and Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, among others, are living examples of this targeting.

12. Why have Sunni forces so far failed to produce a unified political project? And has armed influence in the provinces liberated from ISIS become one of the causes of this division?

After the ISIS period, the liberated provinces became an open arena for various actors and agendas. Their main aim is to control the provinces’ wealth and to stifle any national approach that is independent of foreign designs.

The problem therefore has several dimensions. These include weak coordination among Sunni forces and the absence of a single agreed project. In addition, militias and uncontrolled weapons, backed by some of the ruling parties, have extended their reach.

For these reasons, some of which we have already mentioned, a unified Sunni view or position simply does not exist.

More importantly, the state of crisis and collapse breeds a defeatist mindset, along with a desire to protect personal interests and profit from the chaos. Naturally, this erodes the national stance and the principles that should prevail whenever we discuss the country and its future. Those principles should take the place of clientelism and of handing out posts and privileges without any conditions or criteria that can be defended.

13. Is the option of establishing federal regions in the Sunni-majority provinces still on the table? And how do you read the opposition this project faced when it was proposed in the past?

The Sunnis were not the first to raise the issue of regions. Everyone remembers the attempts to establish a Basra region and, later, a southern region. Regions are a constitutional provision, backed by a clear law. It was on this basis that the Sunni-majority provinces proposed forming administrative, rather than sectarian, regions. However, the head of the executive branch at the time [Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki] stood against them. He refused to let the legal request reach the Independent High Electoral Commission, which would have carried out the procedures the law requires. This means that someone placed himself above the constitution and the law without justification. It also exposes a pattern of overreach and power grabs that goes unpunished.

For now, the issue is no longer a priority, given the series of crises that must be resolved first.

14. You previously led alliances that won the trust of a large share of the Sunni public, only to see them break apart. Why do efforts to unify the Sunni position fail after every election? And where do you stand today on any new project to unite Sunni forces?

Our political efforts to improve an unacceptable reality have never stopped. We have worked to unify positions, and our record in this regard is clear and public. Attempts at unity are shaken to their foundations after every election, driven by greed and the scramble for posts. Even so, it is well known that we led alliances and coalitions that earned the trust of our constituents and won significant seats in the Council of Representatives.

However, things did not go as we had hoped. Many turned against us once posts and privileges were dangled before them, which undermined the results we sought to achieve for our people. Nevertheless, our work has continued, because we feel the full weight of the problems our constituents face, and they expect us to devote ourselves to serving them. Whether as a family, as an approach or as a political path, we never let our people down.

When our office denied the existence of a preparatory body representing the Sunni community, it was responding to inaccurate reports. No such body exists.

As for our political work, role and responsibilities as Secretary-General of the Mutahidoon Party, these continue. We are still seeking solutions, confronting crises and problems, and looking for common ground with others who recognize how deep the crisis runs.

15. There has been talk recently of a political comeback by Osama al-Nujaifi. Are you preparing a new political project, or is your current activity a continuation of a role that never stopped?

Talk of our return to politics, through important meetings with political leaders, is inaccurate. In fact, we never stopped engaging, even though there were periods when I stepped back for health reasons. Accordingly, I would say that, on a personal level, I am not pursuing any goal of my own. Rather, I seek to serve my country and my people. I see the conditions and crises surrounding them, and I cannot accept that these continue. All my efforts are devoted to this, and it is a pledge I will not abandon.

16. Finally, what does Nineveh mean to Osama al-Nujaifi after all the wars it has endured and the political and social transformations it has undergone?

Nineveh is a nation in miniature. It is a homeland firmly rooted in its history, civilizational role and monuments. It is equally defined by the brilliance of its sons and daughters and by the devotion of its people, who hold fast to their principles whatever the sacrifice. Nineveh is, moreover, an essential part of a proud Iraq that we cherish. We have belonged to its land and its noble message to humanity ever since its kings ruled the four quarters of the world.