From the Challenges of Applying the Constitution to the Reform of Lawmaking
Dr. Mohanad Jasim Mohammed Al-Eessawi
Faculty Member, Al-Iraqia University
Who has priority in nominating the Prime Minister? Is it the list that won the most seats in the election, or the parliamentary alliance that forms once the results are announced? The debate over the phrase “the largest parliamentary bloc” in Article 76 of the Iraqi Constitution has shown that concise wording can carry consequences beyond its literal meaning, shaping how power is transferred and governments are formed. In 2010, the Federal Supreme Court read the phrase broadly to cover either a single electoral list or a coalition of several lists, whichever holds the most seats when Iraq’s parliament, the Council of Representatives, first convenes.1
The dispute, then, was about more than counting seats, as it also concerned which entity the seats belong to, when that entity’s status is fixed, and how election results relate to parliamentary alliances. This is where constitutional drafting matters, since the text goes beyond describing a political reality and confers a status that carries priority in a constitutional procedure of great consequence.
The problem also shows that faulty drafting is not necessarily a matter of poor language. The wording may be sound while the elements of the rule remain incomplete, or an article may be clear while its relationship to other provisions is confused. For this reason, assessing the quality of legislation means examining its structure. Who holds the right or the authority? When is it exercised, and by what procedure? And what happens if it cannot be exercised, or if the institutions involved disagree?
The problem also shows that faulty drafting is not necessarily a matter of poor language.
The Largest Bloc and What Drafting Should Settle
The rules on designating a nominee to form the government show why priority in nomination must be kept distinct from the ability to win a vote of confidence. The largest bloc may outnumber every other bloc and still lack, on its own, the votes needed to approve a government. Identifying that bloc therefore sets the starting point of a process without deciding its outcome. That process moves from designation to the naming of ministers, who are presented to the Council of Representatives with the ministerial program. It must also cover cases in which the nominee fails to form a cabinet or the government is denied confidence.2
The rules must also define the criterion for acquiring the status of largest bloc, whether it is tied to the election result or to coalition-building in parliament. Beyond that, they must fix when seats are counted, how the status is proven and challenged, and what happens if membership changes before the designation. Relying on the leading list gives priority to the electoral result, while relying on the alliance gives weight to support built up in parliament. Choosing between them is a decision about the parliamentary system that lies outside the scope of linguistic correction, and the task of drafting is to set the conditions, limits, and effects of that decision.
A phrase open to conflicting readings, however, may simply postpone the dispute until the moment of application, when interests have taken shape and the results of each reading are known. Its cost may then rise, since what could have been a debate about designing a general rule has turned into a struggle over the exercise of power.
This observation does not diminish the constitutional judiciary’s role in interpreting texts or the binding force of its decisions, since the Constitution assigns interpretation to the Federal Supreme Court and makes its decisions final and binding on all authorities. It does, however, distinguish between resolving a judicial dispute and evaluating the quality of the rules that produced it. Being bound by an interpretation does not prevent an inquiry, through the competent channel, into whether a legislative or constitutional remedy is needed.3
Why Setting a Quorum and a Deadline Is Not Enough
Another problem arises in the rules for electing the President of the Republic. Article 59 sets the general quorum for sessions of the Council of Representatives, while Article 70 requires a two-thirds majority to elect the President in the first round and provides for a runoff between the two leading candidates. In 2022, judicial practice went further, requiring two-thirds of the Council’s total membership to be present before the session to elect the President could convene.4
The distinction between quorum and majority matters because a quorum allows the procedure to begin, while a voting majority allows it to produce a result. A candidate’s failure to win and a session’s failure to convene thus require different remedies, since a second round cannot by itself solve the problem of a vote that never starts. A high threshold may aim at broad consensus, but the rules must still keep institutions running when consensus proves unattainable, through a sequence of procedures, deadlines, and alternatives that need not involve lowering the majority. The balance between consensus and the continuity of the state should be a deliberate choice.
A closely related issue is the deadline for electing the President. Article 72(Second)(B) requires a new President to be elected within thirty days of the Council of Representatives’ first session. In 2022, however, the Federal Supreme Court allowed the incumbent to continue exercising his duties until a successor was elected, despite the expiry of that period, on grounds of necessity and the public interest.5
Preventing a vacuum in the presidency is not the same, though, as ensuring that an obligation is met on time. Keeping the President in office may contain some effects of the delay without putting the stalled procedure back on track. Accordingly, regulating a deadline means specifying when it starts and ends, which obligation it governs, what follows if it is missed, and who must resolve the impasse. Not every deadline needs to carry the forfeiture of a right or the lapse of authority, but the effect of delay should be worked out according to the nature of each procedure, before it becomes impossible to carry out.
The distinction between quorum and majority matters because a quorum allows the procedure to begin, while a voting majority allows it to produce a result.
Where Does Policy End and the Responsibility of Drafting Begin?
A clear legislative choice that meets with objection differs from a deliberate choice whose conditions or coherence were undermined in drafting, and both differ from a sound text that the implementing body has ignored. Better wording cannot repair an unsuitable choice, just as good implementation cannot make up for an incomplete allocation of powers. Nor does a breach of the text prove, in itself, that the text is deficient.
On this basis, drafting forms one part of lawmaking without being synonymous with the whole process. It engages with the policy the law is meant to implement and tests whether that policy can be turned into workable provisions. Drafting cannot, however, take the place of the competent authority in deciding questions that the policy itself has left open. Its quality is measured by how well it expresses the chosen policy, reveals what that policy lacks, and sets out its foreseeable legal consequences.6
This is why drafting begins before any article is written. Headline goals such as “strengthening decentralization” or “protecting investment” are not enough unless the problem is defined and the drafters know which rights and powers will change, who bears responsibility, what related legislation exists, and what resources implementation requires. Sometimes reforming an administrative procedure or amending a single provision will suffice, and no parallel law is needed.7
Moreover, scrutiny of a draft extends to the lawfulness of the choice itself, since a clear text that unconstitutionally restricts a right does not become good law merely because it is easy to apply. The effectiveness that counts is therefore the capacity to achieve a legitimate aim through clear rules and well-defined safeguards, which is a higher bar than the mere ability to produce some result.
When Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Fail to Fit Together
Although they differ in rank, constitutional and statutory texts suffer from similar problems when a new power is granted without defining how it relates to an existing one. One example is the conflict between the Law of Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region (No. 21 of 2008) and the State and Public Sector Employees Discipline Law (No. 14 of 1991) over the authority to impose disciplinary penalties on public employees. A 2016 advisory opinion, issued on a question raised by the Ministry of Water Resources, concluded that legislative intervention was needed to resolve it.8
Transferring powers requires tracing the effects on employment, discipline, oversight, and accountability, since a task may move to a new body while some of the means of performing it remain under the old rules. The text must state whether it transfers authority or shares it, whether it abolishes the earlier power or restricts it, and who decides when the bodies concerned disagree. In this way, an intended allocation of powers can be told apart from an unforeseen conflict.
Similarly, replacing a single paragraph can affect definitions, cross-references, and exceptions inside and outside the law, so the review should examine the whole law once the amendment is incorporated. Furthermore, setting a date of entry into force is not enough without rules for pending applications, ongoing procedures, and existing licenses. The law must also distinguish between preserving prior rights and bringing continuing situations under the new law, which helps avoid disputes over its temporal reach.9
Technical Review as an Ongoing Responsibility
Iraq already has an institutional foundation on which to build, since the State Council Law (No. 71 of 2017) entrusts the Council with administrative adjudication, advisory opinions, and legislative drafting. Reform is therefore about more than having a specialized body. It also depends on when that body’s expertise is brought in, how far its review extends, and whether the review continues until the final text is settled.10
Additions can alter a well-crafted draft, and an exception may be removed while its effects remain, so an earlier review does not automatically cover a later amendment. A consolidated version should be examined before adoption to check for clear provisions, consistent terminology, accurate cross-references, workability, and compatibility with higher legal norms, without altering the approved substance in the name of technical correction.11
The history of a text can be preserved by documenting the instructions, memoranda, deliberations, and successive drafts, along with the reasons for accepting or rejecting amendments. Such a record makes it possible to identify the stage at which a flaw arose and to separate deliberate choices from outcomes that slipped through without debate.12 It does not strip the legislature of its power to choose between policies, since technical expertise confers no right of veto over a mere difference of opinion. Expertise can, however, reveal that the drafting may fail to carry out the legislature’s choice or may produce unintended effects, so that the decision is taken with full knowledge of its consequences before it is adopted.
A Path to Reform That Begins Before a Law Is Enacted
At the constitutional level, the remedy depends on the nature of the problem. Regulating how a bloc proves its status is a different task from redefining who holds priority in nominating the Prime Minister, and detailed procedures cannot justify departing from the Constitution or from its binding interpretation. Any change to a constitutional choice must pass through the amendment process, which no revision of an ordinary law or of parliament’s rules of procedure can replace.13
For ordinary legislation, by contrast, the first priority is a preliminary document, prepared before any draft, that identifies the problem and sets out the desired outcome, possible alternatives, and expected effects. A generic justification that merely invokes the public interest and the need to keep pace with change cannot take its place. Ideally, the document would also assess what implementation requires, who will be affected, and what costs the administration and those subject to the law will bear, with the most far-reaching bills analyzed in greater depth.14
The next step is to test the rules against practice. For a licensing law, this means considering applications that meet the conditions, refusals, an authority’s failure to respond, delayed implementing instructions, and existing licenses. For a law creating a board or council, the relevant cases are vacancies, delayed appointments, conflicts of interest, and failure to reach a quorum. The aim is to identify the provisions the scheme needs in order to work, without piling up every conceivable detail.
Matters should also be divided between primary and secondary legislation on a clear basis. The substance of a right, together with the conditions for restricting it and its basic safeguards, should not be left to vague delegation. Implementation details that are likely to change can instead be referred to a lower-ranking instrument within defined limits. This secures flexibility without allowing referral to become a way of postponing legislative decisions.
Review also requires an established professional discipline that combines legal knowledge with linguistic skill, logical rigor, and an understanding of the field being regulated. Drafting economic legislation, for instance, calls for close engagement with economic experts, while drafting rules on public services requires a grasp of how each service reaches the public and of the capacity of the implementing body. University education and practical training can support this discipline, provided that trainees are assessed on their ability to analyze and repair a draft bill, a skill that memorizing drafting rules in isolation from practice cannot demonstrate.15
Access to the law can be improved through consolidated versions linked to the official texts. These should show amendments, repeals, dates of entry into force, and relevant court rulings, while stating their own legal standing and how far they can be relied upon. Finding a copy of a law does not guarantee knowing the rule in force, and making that rule available and understandable is part of legal certainty.16
Finding a copy of a law does not guarantee knowing the rule in force, and making that rule available and understandable is part of legal certainty.
Finally, problems that arise in practice should be fed back to the review body as information sorted by type. Ambiguous terminology is a different problem from a conflict of jurisdiction, and both differ from a shortage of funding or an administration’s failure to comply with the text. Categorizing problems in this way makes it possible to amend the specific provision that has proved deficient or to correct the implementing procedure, so that not every setback is met with a new law.
Conclusion
The controversy over the largest parliamentary bloc, along with the rules for electing the President and the effects of missed deadlines, shows that the quality of drafting is tested when institutions disagree, interests collide, and the usual procedure breaks down. It is at such moments that the value of clearly identifying who holds authority becomes apparent, together with the conditions and limits of its exercise and the alternative path to follow when the process stalls.
A well-drafted text cannot eliminate political disagreement, although it can help keep it within established rules. Leaving essential elements unresolved, on the other hand, may shift the disagreement from a choice between policies to a dispute over who holds the power to decide and how that power is exercised.
Reforming legislative drafting in Iraq begins by returning each decision to its proper place. Questions that require a constitutional choice should be settled at the constitutional level, matters that need statutory regulation should be fully addressed in legislation, and whatever concerns implementation should have its responsibilities and means clearly defined. Attention to the text then serves a purpose well beyond polishing its wording, as it becomes a way of making power more disciplined, rights clearer, and legislation both workable and open to accountability.
Notes and References
- Federal Supreme Court, Decision No. 25/Federal/2010 of 25 March 2010 on the interpretation of the phrase “the largest parliamentary bloc.” The text of the decision is reproduced on the official website of the Supreme Judicial Council in Munther al-Fadhal, “The Federal Court and the Interpretation of Texts” (in Arabic), 5 April 2010. ↩
- Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (2005), Article 76, particularly clauses Second to Fifth, which deal with forming the government, winning a vote of confidence, and designating an alternative nominee. ↩
- Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (2005), Articles 93(Second) and 94, on the Federal Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution and the binding force of its decisions. ↩
- Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (2005), Articles 59 and 70. For an account of how the judiciary applied the quorum requirement to the 2022 session for electing the President, and of the consequences that followed, see Faiq Zaidan, “Amending the Constitution… A Necessity Imposed by Political Reality” (in Arabic), official website of the Supreme Judicial Council, 14 February 2022. ↩
- Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (2005), Article 72(Second)(B). See also Federal Supreme Court Decision No. 24/Federal/2022 of 13 February 2022, as summarized in Faiq Zaidan, op. cit. ↩
- Helen Xanthaki, “Legislative Drafting: A New Sub-Discipline of Law Is Born,” IALS Student Law Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 65-66. The cited pages address the relationship between drafting, the legislative process, and public policy, along with the functional test of legislative quality. ↩
- Ghazi Ibrahim al-Janabi, Legislative Drafting Guide (in Arabic), p. 3, particularly on defining the problem, drawing on technical expertise, reviewing earlier legislation, and confirming that implementation is feasible. ↩
- Mazin Lilo Radhi, “Legal Certainty through Clarity and Easy Access to the Law” (in Arabic), Journal of Legal Sciences, College of Law, University of Baghdad, Issue 1, 2019, p. 19. In footnote 33, Radhi refers to Advisory Opinion No. 96/2016 of 6 September 2016. The case is cited here as reported in his study. ↩
- Helen Xanthaki, op. cit., pp. 61-62, on saving and transitional provisions, repeals, and consequential amendments. ↩
- State Council Law No. 71 of 2017, Articles 1 and 2, Al-Waqa’i al-Iraqiyya (Official Gazette of Iraq), Issue 4456, 7 August 2017, p. 3. ↩
- Helen Xanthaki, op. cit., p. 62, on the continuous scrutiny of drafts as legislation is prepared and on reviewing the final version for form, clarity, applicability, and legal compatibility. ↩
- Khalid Jamal Ahmed Hassan, Principles of Legislative Drafting (in Arabic), section entitled “Preparing a Complete File Documenting All Stages of the Legislative Drafting Process.” ↩
- Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (2005), Articles 13, 93, 94, 126, and 142, bearing in mind the distinction between regulating procedures within constitutional limits and changing the constitutional provisions themselves. ↩
- Institute of Law, Birzeit University, Guide to Regulatory Impact Assessment of Legislation and Government Interventions (in Arabic), 2017, pp. 7 and 10-12. ↩
- Helen Xanthaki, op. cit., p. 65. See also Khalid Jamal Ahmed Hassan, Principles of Legislative Drafting, the passages on providing drafters with supporting tools and drawing on disciplines related to the subject of the legislation. ↩
- Mazin Lilo Radhi, op. cit., pp. 19-20, on the accessibility of legal rules and its connection to legal certainty and the protection of established legal positions. ↩
