Dr. Mahmoud Mohammed Dagher
Former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq · Financial and economic expert and adviser
The withdrawal of international coalition forces raises questions about Iraq’s economic priorities as well as its security arrangements. The most immediate concerns relate to the responsibilities that Iraqi institutions will assume and the resources required to fulfil them. A broader question is whether the transition will allow public spending to shift toward development. The potential consequences for monetary policy are less direct but equally important.
These issues are connected, but they should not be conflated. A change in the security environment does not, in itself, require a change in the exchange rate regime or the instruments used by the Central Bank of Iraq. Its monetary consequences depend on what happens to government expenditure, financing requirements, confidence, and demand for foreign currency. The appropriate starting point is therefore not withdrawal as an isolated event, but the fiscal and institutional adjustments that may follow it.
This distinction is important in an economy where oil revenue finances much of the public budget and government spending strongly influences domestic demand. The IMF has emphasized the role of fiscal policy in Iraq’s recent economic performance, alongside the constraints imposed by oil dependence, the extensive presence of the state, and limited credit to the private sector. Any assessment of the post-withdrawal period must account for these structural features before drawing conclusions about monetary change.
Reassessing Security Expenditure
The expectation that withdrawal will release resources for development is understandable, but it cannot be treated as a budgetary fact. Some responsibilities previously supported through international cooperation may require additional domestic expenditure on training, equipment, maintenance, intelligence, and technical capabilities. The composition of security spending could consequently change without a corresponding reduction in its total cost.
The relevant fiscal question is how much expenditure is required to provide security effectively, and where that expenditure can be made more efficient. A reduction that weakens essential capabilities would carry economic costs of its own. Conversely, maintaining expenditure without reviewing its purpose, performance, and procurement arrangements would miss an opportunity to improve the allocation of public resources.
Development spending requires the same scrutiny. Classification as investment expenditure does not establish a project’s economic value. That value depends on the project’s feasibility, its ability to address a genuine constraint, and whether its expected benefits justify both the initial cost and future operating requirements. Reallocating funds from security to development is meaningful only when it improves the quality of public expenditure.
Iraq’s fiscal position makes this distinction particularly important. IMF estimates indicate that the deficit increased from 1.1% of GDP in 2023 to 4.2% in 2024, alongside higher expenditure on wages and pensions. Accumulated domestic arrears reached approximately IQD 14 trillion. These figures describe fiscal pressures before the withdrawal. They should not be read as estimates of the subsequent budget position. They nevertheless show why spending commitments cannot be considered independently of financing capacity.
Three measures that are often presented as equivalent must therefore be separated: generating savings through greater efficiency, reallocating existing expenditure, and increasing expenditure through additional borrowing. Their effects on the deficit, liquidity, and import demand differ. A transfer between budget headings, without a change in execution or results, does little to improve economic performance.
Rigid recurrent commitments present a further difficulty. When revenue falls, investment is often easier to postpone than wages, pensions, and other continuing obligations. The IMF has warned that fiscal adjustment concentrated on capital expenditure could weaken growth. A credible development strategy must therefore protect well-selected investment within a medium-term expenditure framework rather than leave it dependent on annual residual resources.
Customs Reform and Non-Oil Revenue
Expenditure reform alone cannot provide a durable basis for development finance. It must be accompanied by improvements in non-oil revenue administration. Customs modernization is relevant here because it addresses an existing source of revenue that can be weakened by incomplete documentation, inconsistent procedures, and shortcomings in collection.
The ASYCUDA customs automation system offers a practical instrument for this purpose. Iraq’s implementation project was designed to modernize customs administration, facilitate trade, and improve revenue collection through more standardized and transparent procedures. Its fiscal importance lies in improving the administration of revenue already legally due, not in creating a new tax or a new economic activity.
This is an important qualification when discussing revenue diversification. Better customs collection can increase the contribution of non-oil revenue to the budget, but it is not equivalent to diversifying the productive economy. Nor should additional receipts be assumed merely because procedures have been digitalized. The benefit depends on implementation, data quality, audit capacity, and enforcement.
Used effectively, the system can help narrow the difference between assessed obligations and actual collections. It can also improve the information available to policymakers about imports and the tax base. These gains would create additional fiscal space without requiring development spending to depend entirely on uncertain savings from the security budget.
Automation should therefore be understood as part of institutional reform. Reproducing existing weaknesses in electronic form would achieve little. The more substantial gains come from connecting procedures, establishing accountability, and enabling information to be checked across the institutions responsible for customs, taxation, and payment.
The Monetary Framework
Iraq’s exchange rate arrangement is classified by the IMF as a conventional peg, both de jure and de facto. It belongs to the broader category of soft pegs rather than hard-peg arrangements that impose more binding institutional constraints. Maintaining the peg is a policy choice, not the result of a technical inability to change the rate.
Within this arrangement, the exchange rate provides a nominal anchor for expectations about the dinar’s value and domestic prices. That role is particularly significant when other monetary transmission channels are weak. The IMF has noted the limited response of deposit and lending rates to changes in the policy rate, identifying excess banking liquidity as an important constraint.
Weak transmission should not, however, be interpreted as proof that interest rates are irrelevant. It points to deficiencies in the mechanisms through which monetary decisions influence banks and borrowers. Banking structure, financial intermediation, risk management, and liquidity conditions all influence monetary transmission. Strengthening these mechanisms would expand the central bank’s policy capacity without immediately replacing the exchange rate’s central role.
The exchange rate anchor itself requires more than an announced price. It depends on access to foreign currency for legitimate transactions, adequate liquidity management, and fiscal policy that does not place persistent pressure on the arrangement. When a substantial share of transactions takes place at another rate, the official rate becomes a less effective guide to expectations and pricing.
The fiscal–monetary relationship is especially clear in the conversion of oil receipts into dinars. Under the rates announced in February 2023, the central bank purchases dollars from the Ministry of Finance at IQD 1,300 per dollar, sells them to banks at IQD 1,310, and provides for a selling rate of IQD 1,320 to the final beneficiary. These are distinct rates within the official framework and should not be used interchangeably.
In particular, IQD 1,320 is not the announced rate at which the Ministry of Finance converts its dollar receipts through the central bank. The conversion rate is also a nominal exchange rate, not a “real exchange rate,” which incorporates relative price levels.
The distinction is more than terminological. Changing the nominal conversion rate changes the dinar value of a given amount of dollar revenue, but it does not produce an equivalent increase in the economy’s real resources. Depreciation may ease a budget constraint measured in dinars while raising import costs and reducing purchasing power. Exchange rate adjustment cannot, by itself, resolve weaknesses in expenditure management or non-oil revenue collection.
Understanding the Official–Parallel Rate Gap
The gap between the official and parallel exchange rates remains central to the effectiveness of the monetary framework. It should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of an aggregate shortage of foreign currency. A country may hold substantial reserves while some users remain unable to obtain dollars through formal channels.
The sources of this demand vary. Documentation problems, limited banking access, compliance requirements, and illicit transactions can all play a role. Expectations and precautionary holdings may add further pressure. Their relative importance must be established empirically. Informal activity should not be treated as uniformly illegal.
Since January 2025, international transactions have been financed through commercial banks and their correspondent relationships, with foreign currency balances funded and transactions subject to reviews under anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing requirements. The IMF reported that the transition helped bring customers into the banking system and narrow the official–parallel rate gap.
This was a change in the organization of trade finance, not a replacement of the exchange rate regime. It made the quality of banks’ operations and international relationships more important to importers’ access to official-rate financing. The rate gap is consequently also a banking and institutional problem, not simply a price that can be corrected through intervention.
Customs data can contribute to addressing this problem. Linking customs declarations with banking records would allow external payments to be compared with recorded imports and improve the verification of transactions. Iraq’s ASYCUDA project includes provision for data exchange with public institutions, including the central bank. Such integration would improve the evidence available for supervision. It would not, on its own, eliminate parallel-market demand.
The economic effects of the gap are visible in pricing. Consider an illustrative case in which an importer obtains dollars at IQD 1,320 but prices goods using a rate of IQD 1,600. The difference is IQD 280 per dollar. Where competitive conditions permit, part of that difference may become an additional margin unrelated to productivity.
It would nevertheless be inaccurate to describe the whole difference as net profit. Prices also reflect transport, insurance, duties, storage, financing, replacement costs, and expectations about future access to foreign currency. Importers may face different combinations of these costs. The analytical concern is not that every trader follows the same pricing practice, but that unequal access to foreign exchange can create rents and prevent the benefits of official financing from reaching consumers fully.
The same caution applies to claims about trade with particular countries. Bilateral trade values do not establish how much dollar demand enters the parallel market. Settlement currencies, payment arrangements, and financing channels must first be identified. Without that information, the full value of trade cannot reasonably be treated as cash-dollar demand.
The dollar peg must also be distinguished from the conditions governing dollar payments. The former is an exchange rate policy; the latter involves counterparties, correspondent banks, transaction verification, and specific restrictions. The withdrawal of coalition forces does not remove these financial requirements. They should be discussed in terms of applicable rules and transactions, not broad political descriptions of countries.
How Withdrawal Could Affect Monetary Conditions
The possible monetary effects of withdrawal are indirect, but they should not be dismissed. Changes in security obligations could alter expenditure and financing needs. Changes in perceived risk could influence investment and the preference for holding dinars or foreign currency. A reallocation toward productive investment could, over time, improve domestic supply.
These effects unfold at different speeds. Public expenditure can increase import demand quickly, while investment takes longer to expand output. A project with a high imported component may initially increase demand for dollars and later reduce it if it replaces imports or removes a production constraint. The IMF’s finding that expanded refining capacity contributed to a 40% reduction in fuel imports in 2024 illustrates the importance of the eventual productive return, rather than the spending increase alone.
The method of financing also affects monetary outcomes. Monetary financing adds domestic liquidity without necessarily adding foreign reserves. The IMF has warned that it can place pressure on the central bank’s balance sheet, reserves, and stability, particularly where the capacity to absorb excess liquidity is limited. A security transition that increases expenditure would therefore have different monetary implications depending on whether it is financed through savings, revenue, borrowing, or money creation.
The policy task is to keep new commitments within a realistic fiscal framework while preserving investment with a demonstrable economic return. Stronger non-oil revenue administration can support that effort. At the same time, the central bank should not become the default source of financing for unresolved budget pressures.
There is also a continuing case for facilitating legitimate trade, improving banking services, and strengthening risk-based oversight. These measures address the reasons why transactions move outside official channels. A narrower rate gap is more likely to be sustained when it results from better access and stronger institutions than when it depends solely on repeated market intervention.
Conclusion
The withdrawal of international coalition forces does not, by itself, require a fundamental change in Iraqi monetary policy. If the exchange rate regime, policy objectives, and principal instruments remain unchanged, the framework will retain its essential character.
That conclusion does not imply that monetary conditions will remain unaffected. The same instruments can perform differently when expenditure, liquidity, confidence, and foreign currency demand change. It is therefore more precise to reject an automatic monetary consequence of withdrawal than to deny any possible economic consequence.
The substantive policy question is whether Iraq can maintain its exchange rate framework alongside a more consistent fiscal policy, more effective banking intermediation, and a narrower official–parallel rate gap. Reassessing security expenditure, protecting productive investment, improving customs revenue administration, and verifying trade finance are parts of that task.
The official rate remains an important anchor, but its credibility ultimately rests on the institutions and policies supporting it. Withdrawal may provide an occasion to review those policies. It does not substitute for their reform.
